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NOTES
THE ROLE OF DIRECT-INJURY
GOVERNMENT-ENTITY LAWSUITS
IN THE OPIOID LITIGATION
Edgar Aliferov*
The opioid epidemic has ravaged the United States, killing over 100
Americans every day and costing the nation upward of $90 billion a year.
All branches and levels of the government have pursued measures to combat
the epidemic and reduce its societal costs. Perhaps the most interesting
response is the emergence of direct-injury government-entity lawsuits, which
seek to recover damages from opioid companies that facilitated prescription
pill addictions. Cities, counties, and states across the country are suing
opioid manufacturers and distributors in unprecedented numbers.
This Note explores the role of direct-injury government-entity claims as
compared to other forms of civil litigation employed in the opioid crisis. It
highlights the obstacles faced by parens patriae actions, individual lawsuits,
class actions, and aggregate actions in general. This Note argues that directinjury government claims have important advantages over other forms of
civil litigation because they overcome certain defenses related to victim
blameworthiness and because they function as inherently representative
actions that bypass the certification requirements of traditional aggregate
actions.
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INTRODUCTION
Every day, 115 Americans die from opioid addiction.1 Both former
president Barack Obama2 and current president Donald Trump3 have labeled
the opioid crisis a national emergency. More Americans today use
1. Understanding the Epidemic, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/
index.html [https://perma.cc/B5KM-HH3N] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).
2. See Proclamation No. 9499, 3 C.F.R. 272, 273 (2016).
3. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Declares Opioid Crisis a ‘Health Emergency’ but
Requests No Funds, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/26/
us/politics/trump-opioid-crisis.html [https://perma.cc/492C-M3BY].
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prescription painkillers than tobacco,4 and more people die from heroin than
gun homicides.5 Drug overdoses are the “leading cause of injury death in the
United States”6 and over 60 percent of those deaths involve an opioid.7
The term “opioid” is used to describe a family of drugs prescribed
primarily for pain relief and derived either naturally from opium plants or
artificially by transforming “the chemical structure of . . . naturally occurring
opioids.”8 When used recreationally, opioids produce a euphoric high that
makes them “prone to abuse.”9 While pleasing at first, continual opioid
abuse raises an individual’s tolerance to the drug (requiring higher doses to
“produce pleasure comparable to that provided in previous drug-taking
episodes”), and eventually the individual becomes dependent on opioids to
avoid extreme withdrawal symptoms.10 There are various types of opioids
and most correspond to a marketed pharmaceutical drug: oxycodone
(OxyContin, Percodan, Percocet), hydrocodone (Vicodin, Lortab, Lorcet),
diphenoxylate (Lomotil), codeine, fentanyl (Duragesic), propoxyphene
(Darvon), hydromorphone (Dilaudid), meperidine (Demerol), methadone,
and morphine (Kadian, Avniza, MS Contin).11 Morphine, for example, is a
natural chemical derived from the poppy plant and is used to create the illicit
drug heroin,12 a dangerous substance responsible for 13,000 overdose deaths
in 2015.13
The road to heroin addiction today begins with legal prescription
painkillers. Individuals first become addicted to prescription pills and “move
on to heroin when it becomes too difficult or expensive to access prescription

4. Christopher Ingraham, Prescription Painkillers More Widely Used Than Tobacco,
Federal Study Finds, DENV. POST (Sept. 20, 2016, 8:14 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/
2016/09/20/prescription-painkillers-tobacco-study/ [https://perma.cc/NEN7-J7U5].
5. Christopher Ingraham, Heroin Deaths Surpass Gun Homicides for the First Time,
CDC Data Shows, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
wonk/wp/2016/12/08/heroin-deaths-surpass-gun-homicides-for-the-first-time-cdc-datashow/ [https://perma.cc/7ZPW-LAVG].
6. This conclusion is based on statistics for 2014. DRUG ENF’T AGENCY, DEA-DCT-DIR001-17, 2016 NATIONAL DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT SUMMARY 25 (2016).
7. See Rose A. Rudd et al., Increases in Drug and Opioid-Involved Overdose Deaths—
United States, 2010–2015, 65 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1445, 1445 (2016),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/wr/pdfs/mm655051e1.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XNFSECW].
8. Prescription Opioids, CAMH, https://www.camh.ca/en/health-info/mental-illness-andaddiction-index/prescription-opioids [https://perma.cc/YLA7-UQBS] (last visited Nov. 15,
2018).
9. Id.
10. Thomas R. Kosten & Tony P. George, The Neurobiology of Opioid Dependence:
Implications for Treatment, 1 SCI. & PRAC. PERSP., July 2002, at 13, 14–18.
11. Tony L. Yaksh & Mark S. Wallace, Opioids, Analgesia, and Pain Management, in
GOODMAN & GILMAN’S THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 481, 483–84
(Laurence L. Brunton ed., 12th ed. 2011); List of Extended-Release and Long-Acting Opioid
Products Required to Have an Opioid REMS, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/InformationbyDrugClass/ucm251735.htm
[https://perma.cc/XY8V-U9X5] (last updated Nov. 24, 2017).
12. See Prescription Opioids, supra note 8.
13. See Rudd et al., supra note 7, at 1450 tbl.2.
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opioids.”14 Whereas in the 1960s most opioid addicts began their addiction
by injecting heroin, the average opioid addict today gets hooked by using
prescription pills.15 One study found that 75 percent of high school heroin
users begin their opioid addiction with prescription medications.16
The opioid epidemic has created not only a health crisis, but also an
economic burden on America. From 2011 to 2015, the United States realized
a 1000 percent increase in “professional charges and allowed amounts for
services for patients diagnosed with opioid abuse or dependence.”17 In 2011,
the societal cost of opioid abuse was an estimated $55.7 billion: $25 billion
in health-care costs (primarily excess medical and drug costs), $11.2 billion
in lost earnings from premature death, $7.9 billion in lost productivity, and
$5.1 billion in criminal justice expenditures.18 In 2016, the “monetized
burden” of prescription drug abuse rose to $78.5 billion: $28 billion in
health-care costs, $21.5 billion for overdose treatment, $20 billion in lost
productivity, and $7.7 billion in criminal justice expenditures.19 When
converting the loss of life into monetary figures, the economic burden of the
opioid epidemic is even higher. A health-care specialist from Harvard
Medical School calculated “that loss of life alone costs the economy an
additional sum of between a hundred and a hundred and fifty billion dollars
a year.”20
One method that governments have used to recover the immense costs of
the opioid crisis is to sue opioid companies for the economic harm that they
have suffered as a result of opioid addiction. Quite recently, the popularity
of these direct-injury claims has increased exponentially: cities, counties,
14. Bridget M. Kuehn, Driven by Prescription Drug Abuse, Heroin Use Increases Among
Suburban and Rural Whites, 312 JAMA 118, 119 (2014).
15. Id. The demographic of drug users in the United States has also changed—opioid
addicts in the 1960s were mostly young, uneducated boys, living in heavily populated cities.
Id. at 118–19. The average addict today, however, is fairly well educated, not necessarily
male, and becomes addicted in his or her midtwenties. Id. at 119.
16. CJ Arlotta, More Than 75% of High School Heroin Users Started with Prescription
Opioids, FORBES (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/cjarlotta/2015/12/07/morethan-75-of-high-school-heroin-users-started-with-prescription-opioids/ [https://perma.cc/LM
H5-87T7].
17. The Opioid Crisis: Impact on Healthcare Services and Costs, FAIR HEALTH (2016),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/media2.fairhealth.org/infographic/asset/FH%20Infographic%20%20The%20Opioid%20Crisis-59724533a5ac5.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9WK-3FVD] (“An
allowed amount is the maximum amount an insurer will pay for a covered health service.”).
18. Howard G. Birnbaum et al., Societal Costs of Prescription Opioid Abuse,
Dependence, and Misuse in the United States, 12 PAIN MED. 657, 657–67 (2011).
19. Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, Costs of US Prescription Opioid Epidemic Estimated
at $78.5 Billion, SCIENCEDAILY (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.sciencedaily.com/
releases/2016/09/160914105756.htm [https://perma.cc/X7KK-XMFP]. It is important to note
that the Lippincott study is a more conservative estimate than the Birnbaum study because it
did not take into account the societal costs of lost earnings from premature death. Id.; see also
Birnbaum et al., supra note 18, at 661.
20. These calculations take “a conservative estimate of twenty to thirty thousand opioidrelated deaths a year” and multiplies that figure “by five million dollars—a figure commonly
used by insurance companies to value a human life.” Sheelah Kolhatkar, The Cost of the
Opioid Crisis, NEW YORKER (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/
2017/09/18/the-cost-of-the-opioid-crisis [https://perma.cc/8PBV-9S4H].
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and states ravaged by the opioid epidemic are filing civil complaints against
opioid manufacturers and distributors in increasing numbers.21 This Note
explores the role of the direct-injury claim in the context of the opioid crisis,
and why it is such a popular response. Part I of this Note discusses the variety
of responses that the government has implemented to prevent opioid
addiction, facilitate addiction treatment, and punish the parties responsible
for the opioid epidemic. Part II focuses on direct-injury claims, a measure
that seeks to punish the opioid manufacturers and distributors responsible for
America’s opioid crisis by recovering damages spent on infrastructure and
health care in response to the crisis. Part II also explores the role of these
direct-injury claims by noting the downfalls and challenges of other forms of
civil litigation in the context of the opioid epidemic. Part III then explains
how direct-injury government-entity claims circumvent the obstacles that
have hindered individual, class action, and parens patriae actions against
opioid companies.
I. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO COMBAT THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC
Every branch and level of government has been involved in the fight
against opioid addiction. To understand the distinct role played by directinjury government claims, one must see these lawsuits in the context of the
full panoply of government efforts to deal with the opioid crisis. These
efforts can be split into two categories: proactive and reactive. Proactive
measures aim to prevent American citizens from becoming addicted to
prescription opioids in the first place. Reactive responses aim to treat opioid
addicts and punish the parties responsible for facilitating opioid addiction.
Part I.A discusses proactive measures that attempt to limit the market for
illicit medications through regulation of the legal prescription drug industry.
Although proactive measures are arguably superior because they address the
issue of addiction before it proliferates, the opioid epidemic has grown far
too serious to rely solely on proactive responses. Part I.B discusses reactive
measures that aim to increase treatment options or penalize drug dealers,
prescribers, and companies for facilitating opioid addiction.
A. Proactive Measures: Preventing Addiction
The prescription drug industry must be properly regulated to ensure that
opioids are being used safely and only for medicinal purposes. Congress has
placed much of the responsibility for regulating prescription opioids in the
hands of executive agencies. Two agencies in particular, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), are
highly accountable for regulating the legal prescription drug industry. The
FDA is responsible for regulating prescription painkillers prior to their
21. See Scott Higham & Lenny Bernstein, Drugmakers and Distributors Face Barrage of
Lawsuits over Opioid Epidemic, WASH. POST (July 4, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
investigations/drugmakers-and-distributors-face-barrage-of-lawsuits-over-opioid-epidemic/
2017/07/04/3fc33c64-5794-11e7-b38e-35fd8e0c288f_story.html
[https://perma.cc/5GLRMK6F]; infra notes 101–04 and accompanying text.
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entrance into the market, whereas the DEA regulates the manufacture,
distribution, and possession of prescription medications once they are
released to the public.
The FDA derives its authority to regulate drugs from the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) of 1938.22 The FDCA requires that the
FDA approve every drug before it is manufactured or distributed in the
United States.23 The FDA’s task involves a tough balance between giving
needy patients a valuable medication, reducing prices, and fostering
innovation on one hand and, on the other hand, encouraging safety and
efficacy for companies that are otherwise disincentivized to do so.24 For
example, when the FDA first approved OxyContin,25 members of the
medical community were convinced that it had approved a “gift from nature”:
a medication that provides patients long-term pain relief “with few side
effects.”26 Once the agency understood the risk of opioid addiction and the
misleading nature of Purdue Pharma’s advertisement scheme, its objective
was to offset the danger by strengthening OxyContin’s warning label.27
Since 2007, the FDA has erred on the side of safety and increased its
regulation of prescription opioids by requiring prescription opioid
manufacturers to undergo a three-tiered regulation process before releasing
their drugs to the market.28
The DEA serves as the primary enforcer of the Controlled Substances Act
(CSA).29 The statute requires all distributors and manufacturers of
prescription opioids to generate a “closed system” of distribution and keep
adequate records on the quantity of drugs being produced, purchased, and

22. 21 U.S.C. §§ 351–360fff-7 (2012).
23. Id. § 355(a).
24. Mark A. Ford, Note, Another Use of OxyContin: The Case for Enhancing Liability
for Off-Label Marketing, 83 B.U. L. REV. 429, 430–36 (2001). Despite their complexity, these
regulatory efforts are “inherently superior to tort liability because [they are] proactive rather
than reactive.” Id. at 436.
25. The FDA first approved OxyContin, a controlled-release formula for oxycodone that
“allowed dosing every 12 hours instead of every 4 to 6 hours” in 1995. Timeline of Selected
FDA Activities and Significant Events Addressing Opioid Misuse and Abuse, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN. [hereinafter FDA Opioid Timeline], https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/
InformationbyDrugClass/ucm338566.htm [https://perma.cc/T2AJ-RQBY] (last visited Nov.
15, 2018).
26. Patrick R. Keefe, The Family That Built an Empire of Pain, NEW YORKER (Oct. 30,
2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/10/30/the-family-that-built-an-empireof-pain [https://perma.cc/S83V-VSHV] (quoting Dr. Russell Portenoy, a pain specialist, in
1993).
27. See FDA Opioid Timeline, supra note 25.
28. This three-tiered system is known as the Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy.
Hilary Homenko, Note, Rehabilitating Opioid Regulation: A Prescription for the FDA’s Next
Proposal of an Opioid Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS), 22 HEALTH MATRIX
273, 275 (2012).
29. Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973, 5 U.S.C. app. § 1 (2012); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
PRACTITIONER’S MANUAL: AN INFORMATIONAL OUTLINE OF THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
ACT
4
(2006),
https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/pubs/manuals/pract/
pract_manual012508.pdf [https://perma.cc/BF9C-VK4Q].
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sold in the United States.30 Under authority from the CSA, the DEA
promulgated Rule 1301.74, which requires all distributors to “design and
operate a system to disclose . . . suspicious orders of controlled substances.”31
In addition to reporting these suspicious orders, distributors must prevent
diversion to illegitimate outlets by “conduct[ing] an independent analysis of
suspicious orders prior to completing a sale.”32 The DEA administers,
enforces, and sets detailed regulations in line with the CSA. It has the ability,
for example, to set “quantity and production” quotas for drug manufacturers
and penalize any distributors that fail to adhere to Rule 1301.74.33
Opioid manufacturers and distributors are just one part of the distribution
chain. In addition to regulating their conduct, the government must also
regulate the parties that provide medications directly to patients: the opioid
prescribers. A subset of the Department of Health and Human Services, the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, is responsible for setting federal
guidelines aimed specifically at opioid prescription.34 Each state also has its
own statutory structure for monitoring prescription medications and separate
licensing requirements for physicians, hospitals, and pharmacies.35 Some
states particularly afflicted by the opioid epidemic have added restrictions on
a physician or pharmacy’s ability to dispense prescription medication.
Florida, for example, has completely banned doctors from prescribing
oxycodone on-site.36 This measure has decreased the number of oxycodone
doses purchased in the state by 97 percent.37
By regulating the legal prescription drug industry, the government
effectively limits the market for illicit prescription opioids. However, as the
illicit market for opioids kept growing despite regulatory efforts, state
30. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 29, at 4; see also COMM. ON PAIN MGMT. &
REGULATORY STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS PRESCRIPTION OPIOID ABUSE, PAIN MANAGEMENT AND
THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC: BALANCING SOCIETAL AND INDIVIDUAL BENEFITS AND RISKS OF
PRESCRIPTION OPIOID USE 32 (Richard J. Bonnie et al. eds., 2017),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK458660/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK458660.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4KLA-PFPD].
31. 21 C.F.R. § 1301.74(b) (2018). Suspicious orders are characterized by unusual size,
frequency, or significant deviations from “normal pattern.” Id.
32. Letter from Joseph T. Rannazzisi, Deputy Assistant Adm’r, Office of Diversion
Control, to Cardinal Health (Dec. 27, 2007) (emphasis added). This letter was filed as an
attachment to the government’s motion papers in Cardinal Health, Inc. v. Holder. See
Attachment 5 to Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
Cardinal Health, Inc. v. Holder, 846 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D.D.C. 2012), ECF No. 14-8.
33. Melissa Ferrara, Comment, The Disparate Treatment of Addiction-Assistance
Medications and Opiate Pain Medications Under the Law: Permitting the Proliferation of
Opiates and Limiting Access to Treatment, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 741, 746 (2012).
34. See, e.g., CDC Guidelines for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain, CDC,
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdf/guidelines_at-a-glance-a.pdf [https://perma.cc/ML
W2-7USK] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).
35. See Aaron Gilson & David E. Joranson, Controlled Substances, Medical Practice, and
the Law, in PSYCHIATRIC PRACTICE UNDER FIRE: THE INFLUENCE OF GOVERNMENT, THE
MEDIA, AND SPECIAL INTERESTS ON SOMATIC THERAPIES 173, 181–82 (Harold I. Schwartz ed.,
1994).
36. Lizette Alvarez, Florida Shutting ‘Pill Mill’ Clinics, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/01/us/01drugs.html [https://perma.cc/F4BH-VHAB].
37. Id.
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legislatures began taking a more targeted approach by focusing on the
methods that opioid addicts frequently use to obtain illicit medications. The
two most prominent methods are “doctor shopping” and “pill mills.” Doctor
shopping occurs when a single patient seeks multiple treatment providers to
illicitly procure prescription medications.38 The objective behind doctor
shopping is “to obtain the maximum amount of pills without the medical
community becoming wise to the scheme.”39 Drug abusers also commonly
obtain large amounts of prescription pills through so-called pill mills:
doctors, clinics, or pharmacies that inappropriately prescribe or dispense
prescription medications, often in large quantities.40 The most popular state
solution to address both these issues has been the creation of prescription
monitoring programs (PMPs): systems that track every prescription
medication being dispensed throughout the state and “make it easier for law
enforcement agencies to identify pill mills [and doctor-shopping activity]
without adversely affecting legitimate pain clinics that properly prescribe
controlled medications.”41 Every state aside from Missouri has enacted a
PMP program, and these have “proven effective in helping reduce [the]
availability, abuse, and diversion of illicitly obtained prescription drugs.”42
Unfortunately, PMPs and other reactive measures are insufficient to prevent
American citizens from becoming addicted to prescription opioids.
Therefore, it is necessary for the government to pursue reactive measures that
accept opioid addiction as a reality of American culture and aim to lower the
societal cost of the crisis.
B. Reactive Measures: Treatment, Punishment, and Retribution
There are a variety of reactive measures that American government entities
have pursued to address opioid addiction after it afflicts individuals. In line
with the perspective that opioid addiction is a medical problem rather than a
crime,43 many reactive measures seek to increase opioid-addiction treatment
options for addicted individuals.44 The alternative is a penal approach, which
38. Randy A. Sansone & Lori A. Sansone, Doctor Shopping: A Phenomenon of Many
Themes, 9 INNOVATIONS CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 42, 42–43 (2012).
39. Amy L. Cadwell, In the War on Prescription Drug Abuse, E-Pharmacies Are Making
Doctor Shopping Irrelevant, 7 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 85, 90 (2007).
40. Pia Malbran, What’s a Pill Mill?, CBS NEWS (May 31, 2007),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/whats-a-pill-mill/ [https://perma.cc/6S29-P34S].
41. Ed Woodworth, Note, Pharmageddon: A Statutory Solution to Curb Ohio’s
Prescription Abuse Problem, 26 J.L. & HEALTH 103, 121 (2013) (discussing Ohio’s
implementation of prescription monitoring).
42. See DRUG ENF’T AGENCY, supra note 6, at 26. Thirty-three of the forty-nine states
that utilize PMPs share prescription data among themselves using an InterConnect system
created by the National Association of Boards of Pharmacy. Id.
43. Treating Opioid Addiction as a Chronic Illness, AM. SOC’Y ADDICTION MED.,
https://www.asam.org/docs/default-source/advocacy/cmm-fact-sheet---11-07-14.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B2XZ-7355] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).
44. Some commentators have argued that, unlike other forms of drug addiction, opioid
addiction is more likely to be viewed as a medical problem rather than a crime because it
afflicts mostly white individuals. See German Lopez, When a Drug Epidemic’s Victims Are
White, VOX (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.vox.com/identities/2017/4/4/15098746/opioid-
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addresses on the criminal and tortious conduct by parties that facilitate opioid
addiction through criminal prosecutions and civil litigation, respectively.
1. Increase of Treatment Options
Congress and various bureaucratic agencies have worked to facilitate the
treatment of opioid use disorder (OUD)45 and addiction. Well before the
opioid epidemic, Congress passed the Narcotic Addiction Treatment Act of
1974 (NATA)46 and the Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 2000 (DATA)47
to increase addiction and overdose treatment options for opioid users.48
Congress has also provided huge grants to state governments for substance
abuse treatment.49 Around 32 percent of all state funding for substance abuse
problems comes from a 1992 block grant from the federal government.50 In
2016, the federal government set aside an extra $1 billion for states to
administer and create treatment and recovery programs for opioid users.51
State legislatures have also done their part by increasing access to overdose
or addiction treatments,52 decreasing liability for physicians prescribing
heroin-epidemic-race [https://perma.cc/VR6P-NJDE]; Jesse Mechanic, When a Drug
Epidemic Hit White America, Addiction Became a Disease, HUFFINGTON POST (July 10, 2017),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/when-a-drug-epidemic-hit-white-america-addictionbecame_us_5963a588e4b08f5c97d06b9a [https://perma.cc/3F3K-28AJ].
45. The CDC defines opioid use disorder as “[a] problematic pattern of opioid use that
causes significant impairment or distress” characterized by “unsuccessful efforts to cut down
or control use, or use resulting in social problems and a failure to fulfill obligations at work,
school, or home.” Commonly Used Terms, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/
opioids/terms.html [https://perma.cc/K3CW-YLMJ] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).
46. Narcotics Addiction Treatment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-281, 88 Stat. 124 (codified
at 21 U.S.C. §§ 802, 823, 827 (2012)). The Narcotic Addiction Treatment Act formally
recognized “the practice of using opioids to treat opioid addiction.” Corey S. Davis & Derek
H. Carr, The Law and Policy of Opioids for Pain Management, Addiction Treatment, and
Overdose Reversal, 14 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 1, 17 (2017). For almost fifty years prior to the
enactment of NATA, it was illegal to prescribe methadone or other opioids as a treatment for
drug-dependent individuals. Id.
47. DATA enabled physicians to prescribe narcotics for opioid addiction treatment, which
opened up a broader range of treatment options for opioid users alienated by the idea of
attending drug treatment clinics. See Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106310, § 3502(a)(5), 114 Stat. 1222, 1223–27 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 823(g) (2012)).
48. The main issue with DATA was its limitation on the number of patients a practice can
treat simultaneously: thirty. Id. § 3502(a)(5), 114 Stat. at 1223. Even large clinics with plenty
of physicians were restricted by DATA’s thirty-patient limitation. Id. Over time, the
Department of Health and Human Services fixed this problem by promulgating rules that
expanded the number of persons a single practice could treat simultaneously, raising the limit
in 2016 to 275. 42 C.F.R. § 8.1 (2017).
49. Addressing the Opioid Crisis in America: Prevention, Treatment and Recovery:
Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Labor, Health & Human Servs., Educ. & Related
Agencies of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 115th Cong. 7–10 (2017) (written testimony of
Francis Collins, Elinore McCance-Katz & Debra Houry, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.)
(discussing the Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment block grants of 1992).
50. Id. at 8.
51. The 21st Century Cures Act set aside $1 billion “in funding over 2 years for grants to
states targeting opioid prevention and treatment activities.” COMM. ON PAIN MGMT. &
REGULATORY STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS PRESCRIPTION OPIOID ABUSE, supra note 30, at 29.
52. In the past, states imposed barriers that prevented laypersons from accessing
overdose-reversing drugs, by, for example, restricting doctors from prescribing naloxone “for
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overdose-treatment drugs,53 and providing legal immunity to bystanders who
assist during overdoses.54 By 2016, forty-seven states had passed legislation
that does one or more of the following: (1) provides immunity to prescribers
of overdose treatments such as naloxone;55 (2) permits doctors to make thirdparty prescriptions of overdose treatments to friends, family, or
acquaintances of an overdosing patient;56 or (3) authorizes trained responders
to administer naloxone “if they believe[] someone [i]s experiencing a drug
overdose.”57 Furthermore, all of these forty-seven states have passed some
form of a Good Samaritan law that grants either reduced liability or complete
“immunity to individuals who summon emergency aid in the event of an
overdose.”58
The FDA has employed its regulatory authority to authorize abusedeterrent opioids,59 medications that prevent OUD,60 and drugs that reverse
overdoses.61 Furthermore, the FDA has had an important role (either on its
own or with other agencies) researching the effects of opioid use and
educating the public about substance abuse problems.62 These treatment
measures are complemented by reactive measures that focus on penalizing
wrongful actions rather than assisting addicted persons.
2. Criminal Prosecutions
State and federal governments criminally prosecute any party responsible
for facilitating the opioid epidemic—whether it be street dealers, doctors, or
huge pharmaceutical companies.63 Although the federal government and
most states have chosen to view opioid addiction as an illness by focusing
more on addiction treatment, some states are reinvigorating a “tough on
crime” approach to deter drug dealers. Kentucky, for example, has recently
increased penalties for heroin trafficking,64 and Florida has enacted a law that
persons other than the person to whom they are to be administered (a process referred to as
third-party prescription) or to a person the physician has not personally examined.” Davis &
Carr, supra note 46, at 29. By 2016, however, almost all states had modified their laws to
“improve layperson naloxone access.” Id. at 30.
53. Id. at 30–32.
54. Id. at 33.
55. Id. at 30–32.
56. Id. at 31.
57. Daniel Rees et al., With a Little Help from My Friends: The Effects of Naloxone
Access and Good Samaritan Laws on Opioid-Related Deaths, 78 RES. BRIEFS ECON. POL’Y,
June 2017, at 1, 1.
58. Davis & Carr, supra note 46, at 33.
59. See FDA Opioid Timeline, supra note 25 (noting that on July 23, 2014, the FDA
approved Targiniq ER, an abuse-deterrent, extended-release pain reliever). In 2013, the FDA
went beyond its role of authorization and actually assisted the opioid industry in creating new
abuse-deterrent opioids. Id.
60. The FDA “has approved three medications for the treatment of OUD: methadone,
buprenorphine, and naltrexone.” Davis & Carr, supra note 46, at 13.
61. Id. at 28.
62. See FDA Opioid Timeline, supra note 25.
63. See DRUG ENF’T AGENCY, supra note 6, at 28–40.
64. KY. REV. STAT. ch. 218A (2018).
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charges drug dealers with murder if their customers overdose on opioids.65
The DEA takes a similar “tough on crime” approach. In 2001, it initiated a
plan to “investigate and prosecute doctors for improper prescribing of
OxyContin.”66 Federal prosecutors have used a variety of liability theories
to sue physicians, ranging from unlawful distribution of controlled
substances resulting in death67 to money laundering.68 From 1998 to 2006,
there were a total of 986 lawsuits against physicians “involving the
prescribing of opioid analgesics.”69 About 80 percent of the physicians “pled
guilty or no contest to at least one of the criminal charges brought against
them.”70
Prosecutors also target pharmacists who illegally distribute prescription
opioids. Of particular interest are internet “e-pharmacies” that have the
ability to dispense millions of prescription pills and evade regulatory
mechanisms implemented by states.71 United States v. Tobin72 featured an
attack on one such internet pharmacy, Jive Network, which connected
consumers to doctors who spent under ten seconds reviewing orders and
filled thousands of prescriptions without hesitation.73 The DEA also
collaborates with federal prosecutors to bring cases against opioid
manufacturers and distributors. In 2002, the U.S. Attorney for the Western
District of Virginia began a criminal investigation focused on Purdue’s
misbranding of OxyContin.74 The investigation culminated in a guilty plea
by Purdue Frederick Company, Inc., the manufacturer of OxyContin at the
time. Purdue and three of its top executives were forced to pay “more than
$600 million to federal and state agencies.”75 Civil lawsuits filed by
65. FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1)(a)(3) (2018).
66. Richard C. Ausness, The Role of Litigation in the Fight Against Prescription Drug
Abuse, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 1117, 1157–58 (2014).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Ignasiak, 667 F.3d 1217, 1228–29 (11th Cir. 2012); United
States v. McIver, 470 F.3d 550, 556 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463,
475 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Williams, 445 F.3d 1302, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Alerre, 430 F.3d 681, 688 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Valdivieso Rodriguez, 532 F. Supp. 2d 316, 321–22 (D.P.R. 2007).
69. Donald M. Goldenbaum et al., Physicians Charged with Opioid AnalgesicPrescribing Offenses, 9 PAIN MED. 737, 741–43 (2008).
70. Id.
71. Some critics argue that “e-pharmacies” render doctor shopping irrelevant by giving
opioid addicts a quick and easy method to obtain illicit prescription medications. See Cadwell,
supra note 39, at 107–16.
72. 676 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2012).
73. Id. at 1271.
74. Purdue had engaged in deceptive sales techniques: training their sales representatives
“to make false representations to health care providers” and claiming that OxyContin was
difficult to abuse, less addictive and less euphoric than other opioids, lacked withdrawal
symptoms, and provided “fewer peaks and valleys” than other opioids. Paul D. Frederickson,
Criminal Marketing: Corporate and Managerial Liability in the Prescription Drug Industry,
22 MIDWEST L.J. 115, 137 (2008). All these assertions were false. Id.
75. Id. at 115. “After their pleas, the Department of Health and Human Services barred
the three [Purdue executives] for 20 years from doing business with Medicare or other
taxpayer-financed health care program[s].” Barry Meier, Ruling Is Upheld Against Executives
Tied to Oxycontin, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/16/
business/16purdue.html [https://perma.cc/BN8R-2BMM].
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individuals and class actions were a great help to DEA officials; information
gathered during those early lawsuits was utilized to convict the opioid
companies.76
Whereas criminal actions against opioid manufacturers are focused on
alleged misrepresentations and deceptive marketing, criminal actions against
opioid distributors are focused on a lack of oversight and violations of the
Controlled Substances Act. The DEA penalizes those distributors that fail to
adhere to the regulations set forth in the CSA.77 For example, in 2007, the
DEA issued an immediate suspension order (ISO) and fined Cardinal Health
$34 million for failing to prevent (or notify the DEA) of its hydrocodone
distribution to illegitimate internet pharmacies.78
3. Civil Lawsuits
In addition to criminal prosecutions, there have been many civil lawsuits
filed against opioid companies by governments seeking to recover damages
resulting from the opioid epidemic. Although the viability of the tort theories
has not been tested in court, the rise in settlement figures over the years
indicates the growing success of such lawsuits.79 In 2004, Purdue settled
with West Virginia for a small sum of $10 million.80 West Virginia was
required to use the proceeds from settlement to fund programs that further
educate doctors, encourage drug prevention, or facilitate drug
rehabilitation.81
This settlement motivated twenty-six other states to bring suit in 2007,
which culminated with a $19.5 million settlement in the states’ favor.82 In
addition, the settlement required Purdue to (1) “market and promote
76. “Then, as Hanly [a prominent lawyer that lead civil trials against Purdue Pharma] tells
it, the Justice Department caught wind of the civil litigation and asked if he would help with
a budding criminal investigation into Purdue. Hanly was happy to assist.” Andrew Joseph, A
Veteran New York Litigator Is Taking on Opioid Makers: They Have a History, STAT NEWS
(Oct.
10,
2017),
https://www.statnews.com/2017/10/10/opioid-lawsuits-paul-hanly/
[https://perma.cc/TA35-BA8L].
77. See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text.
78. “In December 2007, DEA issued an ISO at the location as a result of its distribution
of hydrocodone to ‘rogue’ internet pharmacies. That action, and similar actions at other
Cardinal Health facilities across the United States, resulted in a $34 million fine.” Press
Release, Drug Enf’t Admin., DEA Suspends for Two Years Pharmaceutical Distributor’s
Ability to Sell Controlled Substances from Lakeland, Florida Facility (May 15, 2012),
https://www.dea.gov/pubs/pressrel/pr051512.html [https://perma.cc/ANE3-5VN2].
79. See Ausness, supra note 66, at 1149.
80. Christopher R. Page, Comment, These Statements Have Not Been Approved by the
FDA: Improving the Postapproval Regulation of Prescription Drugs, 88 OR. L. REV. 1189,
1205 (2009).
81. See Frederickson, supra note 74, at 134.
82. The states were permitted to allocate their share of the $19.5 million as they each saw
fit. John O’Brien, Purdue Pharma Settles Multi-State Marketing Claim, LEGAL NEWS LINE
(May 8, 2007), http://legalnewsline.com/stories/510518258-purdue-pharma-settles-multistate-marketing-claim [https://perma.cc/HVZ7-7GAC]; see Press Release, Wash. State Office
of the Att’y Gen., Washington to Receive Share of $19.5 Million Settlement with OxyContin
Maker (May 8, 2007), http://www.atg.wa.gov/news/news-releases/washington-receive-share195-million-settlement-oxycontin-maker [https://perma.cc/ZYQ6-CQ8W].
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OxyContin in a manner consistent with its package insert and not in a manner
that minimizes the approved uses for the drug”; (2) refrain from “market[ing]
or promot[ing OxyContin] for off-label uses”;83 (3) ensure that any person or
entity receiving funding from Purdue disclose the source of that funding;
(4) refrain from “sponsoring or funding any educational events” if the
speaker recommends off-label uses of OxyContin; (5) refrain from paying
bonuses to salespersons that are contingent upon the volume of OxyContin
sold; and (6) “make sure that prescriber education about OxyContin and its
potential for abuse and diversion is a component of the evaluations of Purdue
sales representatives.”84
Also in 2007, the state of Kentucky and the government of Pike County,
Kentucky, sued Purdue Pharma for alleged misrepresentations regarding the
highly addictive nature of OxyContin.85 Pike County alone settled with
Purdue for $4 million in 2013.86 The state of Kentucky settled with Purdue
for $24 million in 2015—$13.5 million more than Purdue’s offer to the state
in 2007.87 Around the time that Pike County settled with the opioid
manufacturer, California began its litigation against Purdue Pharma.
California joined other manufacturers of prescription opioids besides Purdue
and alleged damages resulting from negligent and deceptive marketing in the
form of downplaying the risks of opioid painkillers.88 One of the named
defendants in the lawsuit, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries,89 settled its claims
in 2017 by agreeing to pay $1.6 million.90
Government entities have also targeted distributors of prescription opioids.
In 2012, West Virginia’s Attorney General (AG) sued Cardinal Health and
AmerisourceBergen (two of the three leading distributors of prescription
opioids in America)91 for their failure to monitor suspicious orders, which
83. Off-label uses are “those purposes beyond the FDA-approved indications and uses of
the drug.” Press Release, Ill. Att’y Gen., Attorney General Madigan Reaches Agreement with
Pharmaceutical Company over Its Promotion of Pain Reliever OxyContin (May 8, 2007),
http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2007_05/20070508.html [http://perma.cc/
D52A-RVBH].
84. Id.
85. Ausness, supra note 66, at 1149–50.
86. Id. at 1156.
87. Verdict and Settlement Summary, Commonwealth v. Purdue Pharma, No. 07-CI01303 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Dec. 22, 2015), 2015 WL 10458550; see also Kentucky Settles Lawsuit
with OxyContin Maker for $24 Million, CBS NEWS (Dec. 23, 2015, 5:11 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/kentucky-settles-lawsuit-with-oxycontin-maker-for-24million/ [https://perma.cc/MDR4-3PS2].
88. See Complaint for Violations of California False Advertising Law, California Unfair
Competition Law, and Public Nuisance, Seeking Restituion, Civil Penalties, Abatement, and
Injunctive Relief, California v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 8:14-CV-1080-JLS DFM, 2014 WL
6065907 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2014), ECF No. 1-1.
89. Teva manufactures, sells, and distributes the prescription opioids Actiq and Fentora.
Id. at 8.
90. Nate Raymond, Teva to Pay $1.6 Million to Resolve California Counties’ Opioid
Case, REUTERS (May 25, 2017, 5:09 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/health-teva/tevato-pay-1-6-million-to-resolve-california-counties-opioid-case-idUSL1N1IR1W3
[https://perma.cc/U72S-GFJV].
91. McKesson Corporation, Cardinal Health, Inc., and AmerisourceBergen Drug
Corporation are considered the “Big 3” of opioid distribution, “dominat[ing] 85 percent of the
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facilitated the operation of pill mills throughout the state.92 West Virginia
sued for violations of the West Virginia Uniform Controlled Substances Act,
the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act, and the West
Virginia Antitrust Act; the state also asserted public nuisance and negligence
claims.93 In 2016, both Cardinal Health and AmerisourceBergen settled with
West Virginia for $36 million.94
That same year, Cardinal Health entered into yet another huge settlement.
This time Cardinal settled to “resolv[e] the outstanding civil penalty portion
of the company’s 2012 administrative settlement with the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Agency.”95 The $44 million settlement was made with the
federal prosecutors in the Middle District of Florida, the Southern District of
New York, the District of Maryland, and the Western District of
Washington.96 Cardinal’s New York distribution center, for example, failed
to report more than twenty highly suspicious orders to the DEA.97 The next
year, another distributor of opioid analgesics, Mallinckrodt Pharmaceuticals,
entered into a similar settlement for its failure to report suspicious orders of
oxycodone products. Mallinckrodt reached a $35 million settlement with the
DEA, the Eastern District of Michigan, and the Northern District of New

market share for the distribution of prescription opioids.” Complaint at 5, City of Birmingham
v. AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., No. 2:17-CV-01360-JEO (N.D. Ala. Aug. 14, 2017), ECF
No. 1; see also Adam J. Fein, 2016 MDM Market Leaders: Top Pharmaceutical Distributors,
MDM, http://www.mdm.com/2016-top-pharmaceuticals-distributors [http://perma.cc/CV2BPT4W] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018) (“Three companies account for about 85 percent to 90
percent of all revenues from drug distribution in the United States: AmerisourceBergen
Corporation (NYSE:ABC), Cardinal Health, Inc. (NYSE:CAH) and McKesson Corporation
(NYSE:MCK).”).
92. See Complaint at 7–8, West Virginia ex rel. Morrisey v. Cardinal Health, Inc., No.
A212-CV-3836, 2013 WL 1305647 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 27, 2013), ECF No. 1-1.
93. See id. at 8–22.
94. See Charles Ornstein, Drug Distributors Penalized for Turning Blind Eye in Opioid
Epidemic, NPR (Jan. 27, 2017, 5:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/
2017/01/27/511858862/drug-distributors-penalized-for-turning-blind-eye-in-opioidepidemic [https://perma.cc/QD2U-NLGR] (“That’s on top of another $20 million that
Cardinal Health agreed this month to pay the state of West Virginia, which has been among
the hardest hit by opioid overdoses. Other distributors have also agreed to pay smaller
amounts to West Virginia within the past few months. AmerisourceBergen, for instance, will
pay $16 million.”); Press Release, Cardinal Health, Cardinal Health Reaches Settlement with
West Virginia (Jan. 9, 2017), http://ir.cardinalhealth.com/news/press-release-details/2017/
Cardinal-Health-Reaches-Settlement-With-West-Virginia/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/R4
Y6-DFYH] (“Under the terms of the settlement, Cardinal Health has agreed to pay $20 million
to the State of West Virginia to resolve these issues, and the State has released the company
from any further actions.”).
95. Press Release, Cardinal Health, Cardinal Health Announces Civil Settlement with
DOJ (Dec. 23, 2016), http://ir.cardinalhealth.com/news/press-release-details/2016/
CARDINAL-HEALTH-ANNOUNCES-CIVIL-SETTLEMENT-WITH-DOJ/default.aspx
[https://perma.cc/25QP-3DZW].
96. Id.
97. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces $10 Million
Civil Penalty Recovery Against New York Pharmaceutical Distributor Kinray, Llc. (Dec. 23,
2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-announces-10-millioncivil-penalty-recovery-against-new-york [https://perma.cc/4TDJ-Y23F].
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York.98 The “groundbreaking” aspect of this settlement was that it
prospectively required Mallinckrodt to utilize its discounting system99 as a
monitoring device for suspicious orders.100
Recently, there has been an explosion of lawsuits by government entities
targeting opioid companies for their role in the opioid epidemic.101 In
Kentucky alone, twenty-four counties have sued opioid-industry defendants,
alleging harms caused by the three major opioid distributors in the country:
Amerisource, Cardinal Health, and McKesson.102 The sheer number of
claims prompted calls for multidistrict litigation,103 which led to a
consolidation of over one hundred opioid lawsuits.104 These civil actions
target a broad range of parties:
opioid distributors,105 opioid
106
107
pharmacies,
state pharmacy boards,108 and
manufacturers,
109
Overall, however, the focus seems to be on the companies that
physicians.

98. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Mallinckrodt Agrees to Pay Record $35 Million
Settlement for Failure to Report Suspicious Orders of Pharmaceutical Drugs and for
Recordkeeping Violations (July 11, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/mallinckrodtagrees-pay-record-35-million-settlement-failure-report-suspicious-orders [https://perma.cc/
VK6L-HWZU].
99. Many manufacturers, including Mallinckrodt, offer discounts or “chargebacks” to
their downstream consumers who purchase the most oxycodone. Id. As part of Mallinckrodt’s
settlement, the company was required to use its existing chargeback system “to monitor and
report to DEA suspicious sales of oxycodone.” Id.
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., Complaint, Fiscal Court v. AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., No. 4:17-CV00120-JMH-HBB (W.D. Ky. Sept. 13, 2017), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Union County
Complaint]; Complaint, Illinois v. AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., No. 3:17-cv-00876 (S.D.
Ill. Aug. 17, 2017), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Illinois Complaint]; Complaint, City of
Birmingham v. AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., No. 2:17-CV-01360-JEO (N.D. Ala. Aug.
14, 2017), ECF No. 1; Complaint, County of San Joaquin v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 2:17CV-01485-MCE-GGH (E.D. Cal. July 17, 2017), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter San Joaquin
Complaint]; Complaint, Kanawha Cty. Comm’n v. Rite Aid of Md., Inc., No. 2:17-CV-01666
(S.D.W. Va. Mar. 9, 2017), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Kanawha County Complaint]; Complaint,
City of Everett v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 2:17-CV-00209-RSM (W.D. Wash. Feb 10,
2017), ECF No. 1-1 [Everett Complaint].
102. See Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Transfer of Actions Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1407 for Coordinated or Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings at 20, In re Nat’l
Prescription Opiate Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 1375 (J.P.M.L. 2017), ECF No. 1-1 [hereinafter
MDL Brief]; Complaint, Fiscal Court v. AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., No. 1:17-OP45031-DAP (E.D. Ky. Sep. 20, 2017), ECF No. 1; Complaint, Fiscal Court v.
AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., No. 3:17-CV-557-TBR (W.D. Ky. Sept. 13, 2017), ECF
No. 1; Union County Complaint, supra note 101.
103. MDL Brief, supra note 102, at 20; Sara Randazzo, Washington State Joins Legal
Challenges over Opioids, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 28, 2017, 2:40 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/washington-state-joins-legal-challenges-over-opioids-1506624009 [https://perma.cc/
4GU4-5D9M].
104. See infra note 323 and accompanying text.
105. See infra note 323 and accompanying text.
106. See Complaint, City of Parma v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 1:17-CV-1872 (N.D. Ohio
Aug. 9, 2017), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Parma Complaint].
107. See Kanawha County Complaint, supra note 101.
108. See Complaint, Cty. Comm’n v. W. Va. Bd. of Pharmacy, No. 2:17-CV-3366 (S.D.W.
Va. June 22, 2017), ECF No. 1-1.
109. See Parma Complaint, supra note 106.
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are profiting the most from opioid addiction—the manufacturers and
distributors of prescription opioids.
State AGs have sued firearm, lead paint, automobile, and tobacco
companies in the past using similar tactics. The lawsuits against the tobacco
industry led to the “largest legal settlement in United States history”110—a
settlement with an actual value of over $210 billion between forty-six states
and six tobacco manufacturers (known as the “Master Settlement
Agreement”).111 But even compared to the tobacco litigation, the current
opioid litigation is unparalleled. Whereas in the tobacco litigation only states
and a few government subdivisions sued tobacco companies,112 in the opioid
litigation, there is a “profusion of county and municipal plaintiffs.”113 There
is also a larger and more diverse group of defendants in the current opioid
litigation than in the tobacco litigation. The tobacco litigation involved only
six major manufacturers whereas the opioid litigation involves “at least 20
opioid manufacturers and 13 distributors” as well as local pharmacies,
physicians, and pharmacy boards.114 Perhaps the most interesting aspect of
the opioid litigation, however, is the fact that so many claims are focused on
direct injury to the government’s interests rather than the interests of citizens
or consumers.
II. DIRECT-INJURY GOVERNMENT-ENTITY LAWSUITS
IN THE CONTEXT OF THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC
Government-entity lawsuits against opioid companies are reactive
responses that seek to recover damages incurred from the opioid epidemic.
These lawsuits employ a wide variety of liability theories that take the form
of either parens patriae claims on behalf of the citizenry or direct-injury
claims on behalf of the government itself. The lawsuits generally target
opioid manufacturers for alleged misrepresentations during advertisement115
or opioid distributors for an alleged failure to monitor illicit distribution.116
Most importantly, these lawsuits have the potential to avoid the pitfalls of
other forms of civil litigation.
A. What Is a Direct-Injury Claim?
When initiated by a party other than the government, a direct-injury claim
is simple: a plaintiff’s personal interests (e.g., health or property) have been
110. Ryan D. Dreveskracht, Forfeiting Federalism: The Faustian Pact with Big Tobacco,
18 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 291, 292 (2015).
111. Gregory W. Traylor, Note, Big Tobacco, Medicaid-Covered Smokers, and the
Substance of the Master Settlement Agreement, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1081, 1085 (2010).
112. There were “only a few governmental subdivisions [that] sued [tobacco companies]
when their state attorneys general refused to join the litigation.” Richard Scruggs, Are Opioids
the New Tobacco?, LAW360 (Sept. 15, 2017, 11:04 AM), https://www.law360.com/
articles/962715 [https://perma.cc/7JSX-WCRT].
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See infra notes 132–33 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 133–36 and accompanying text.
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injured by a third party and the plaintiff seeks to recover damages flowing
from that injury. In the context of government-entity lawsuits, however, the
distinction between direct-injury claims and parens patriae claims has
caused undue confusion.117 Both of these terms relate to the damages
asserted by the plaintiff and describe whether the damages are asserted on
behalf of the citizens (parens patriae) or on behalf of the government itself
(direct injury).
Parens patriae directly translates to “parent of the nation,” and the name
is derived from the king’s duty “‘to take care of his subjects as are legally
unable’ to care for themselves . . . including children and those afflicted by
mental infirmity, as well as the oversight of charitable trusts.”118 The modern
American parens patriae claim can be asserted by cities, counties, and states
but is not limited to “children and those afflicted by mental infirmity.”119
Parens patriae standing cannot be invoked by cities or counties because they
are not considered sovereigns;120 municipalities must pair their parens
patriae claims with direct-injury claims to satisfy standing requirements. To
assert a parens patriae claim, the government entity must prove that it is
“more than a nominal party” in the suit—meaning that the government must
prove injury to its own interests and not just the interests of a small group of
citizens.121 There must be an injury to a “quasi-sovereign” interest of the
state: “an interest apart from the interests of particular private parties,” which
involves either a wide-sweeping injury to “the health and well-being—both
physical and economic—of its residents in general” or a violation of the
state’s right to “not be[] discriminatorily denied its rightful status within the
federal system.”122

117. This complex distinction has led even federal judges to confuse the two types of
claims. See Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 962–63 (E.D. Tex. 1997)
(evaluating standing for a direct-injury claim by the state of Texas under the quasi-sovereign
interest test as if the claim was parens patriae); Jack Ratliff, Parens Patriae: An Overview, 74
TUL. L. REV. 1847, 1853 n.39 (2000) (“It is not entirely clear to me why the parens doctrine
was important in [Texas v. American Tobacco Co.], as it was brought by the State of Texas
for its own damages.”).
118. Margaret S. Thomas, Parens Patriae and the States’ Historic Police Power, 69 SMU
L. REV. 759, 769 (2016) (quoting JOSEPH CHITTY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE
PREROGATIVES OF THE CROWN AND THE RELATIVE DUTIES AND RIGHTS OF THE SUBJECT 155
(1820)). The “Universal Sovereignty Theory” involves the belief that the American parens
patriae doctrine is derived directly from the old king’s authority. See id. at 769–84. Although
some prominent American parens patriae cases claim roots in the Universal Sovereignty
Theory, the parens patriae doctrine invoked by government entities today originates from an
American doctrine that echoes similar themes to the king’s notion of parens patriae but lacks
direct relation. See id.
119. Id. at 769. In fact, the first American parens patriae case involved government entities
suing on behalf of charities that lacked an appointed guardian. See generally Vidal v. Girard’s
Ex’rs, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127 (1844).
120. Kathleen C. Engel, Do Cities Have Standing? Redressing the Externalities of
Predatory Lending, 38 CONN. L. REV. 355, 368 & n.54 (2006).
121. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).
122. Id.
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Parens patriae claims are distinct from direct-injury claims, where the
government asserts injury to itself. In Massachusetts v. EPA,123 a parens
patriae lawsuit against the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for its
failure to properly regulate greenhouse gases, the U.S. Supreme Court made
clear that “a claim of parens patriae standing is distinct from an allegation
of direct injury.”124 When the state itself has been injured by tortious
conduct, there is no need to assert a parens patriae claim because the state
“can directly vindicate its interests as fully as any other litigant.”125
In the case of the opioid litigation, it is easy to imagine every claim as
being both parens patriae and direct injury. If the government entity alleges
damages to its treasury (due to, for example, medical costs and infrastructure
costs expended upon opioid addicts) or lost tax revenue due to lost
productivity from addiction,126 then there is quite clearly injury to the state’s
proprietary interests.127 That same government entity can easily reword its
argument to make a parens patriae assertion. For example, the government
can argue that large numbers of consumers have been tricked by opioid
manufacturers’ claims or that its citizens are endangered by the prevalence
of opioid addiction across communities and allege injury to “the health and
well-being—both physical and economic—of its residents in general,”
thereby establishing a viable parens patriae claim.128 For this reason, many
states and counties assert both direct-injury and parens patriae claims (or
parens patriae standing) in the ongoing opioid litigation.129 One could view
direct-injury claims as a worse, better, or equivalent substitute for parens
patriae claims when battling opioid companies. Direct-injury claims in the

123. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
124. Id. at 538; see also Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 448–51 (1992).
125. Richard P. Ieyoub & Theodore Eisenberg, State Attorney General Actions, the
Tobacco Litigation, and the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1859, 1882 (2000).
126. Many of the nuisance claims brought by government entities allege damages based on
law enforcement and health services expenditures. See, e.g., Union County Complaint, supra
note 101; Complaint, Hocking Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., No.
2:17-CV-00769-GCS-KAJ (S.D. Ohio Aug. 31, 2017), ECF No. 1; Illinois Complaint, supra
note 101.
127. See 15 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 101.60(4)(b)–(c) (Daniel R. Coquillette et al.
eds., 3d ed. 2018) (distinguishing direct injury to a state’s propriety interests from parens
patriae injury to quasi-sovereign interests).
128. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607
(1982).
129. See, e.g., Illinois Complaint, supra note 101 (asserting “recovery for [the state’s] own
harm” throughout the complaint but also claiming parens patriae standing); San Joaquin
Complaint, supra note 101 (asserting damages to the state’s proprietary interests and then
incorporating all of its claims on behalf of its citizens through parens patriae); Complaint at
14, City of Dayton v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 3:17-CV-00229-TMR (S.D. Ohio July 10,
2017), ECF No. 3 [hereinafter Dayton Complaint] (“Plaintiff brings this action on its own
behalf and also as a subrogee of its employees and residents . . . .” (emphasis added)). In
Staubus v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., the attorneys general for three judicial districts of Tennessee
asserted direct injury to the government entities’ interests but also brought a creative parens
patriae claim on behalf of all the babies in those districts who were born addicted to opioids
as a result of manufacturers’ allegedly negligent marketing. Complaint, Staubus v. Purdue
Pharma, L.P., No. 2:17-CV-00122 (E.D. Tenn. July 27, 2017), ECF No. 1-1.
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context of the opioid epidemic come in two forms: false or misleading
advertising claims and failure to monitor claims.
B. Different Types of Direct-Injury Lawsuits
Direct-injury government-entity lawsuits against opioid manufacturers
and distributors employ a variety of liability theories and can be categorized
into two types of claims, based on the defendant’s identity and allegedly
tortious conduct. The first type of claim is generally made against
manufacturers for misleading marketing.130 The second type of claim is
generally made against distributors for a failure to monitor suspicious
orders.131 Some lawsuits include both types of claims in their complaint.132
For both types of claims, the government asserts that the defendants
performed a wrongful act and that, as a result, the plaintiff (the government
itself) suffered damages. The distinguishing features between each type of
claim is the asserted act and the set of named defendants. For the first type
of claim, the wrongful conduct is the misrepresentation that occurs when
defendants disseminate false or misleading information regarding the risks
or benefits of prescription opioids.133 Thus, these claims target the
companies responsible for marketing and advertising prescription opioids,
usually prescription opioid manufacturers such as Purdue Pharma, Teva,
Cephalon, Inc., Johnson & Johnson, and Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc.134
For the second type of claim, the wrongful conduct is an alleged failure to
monitor, otherwise known as “diversion,” which “charg[es] that the
defendants breached duties to secure the distribution chain from diversion of
large quantities of opioid-containing prescription drugs to criminals.”135 The
“diversion theory was not used in the tobacco litigation and seems to be
unique to the opioid cases.”136 These claims target the parties responsible

130. See, e.g., Dayton Complaint, supra note 129, at 79–197; Original Petition at 12–20,
Oklahoma ex rel. Hunter v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. CJ-2017-816 (Okla. Dist. Ct. June 30,
2017) [hereinafter Oklahoma Complaint]; Verified Complaint at 80–203, County of Nassau
v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 605477/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 12, 2017), NYSCEF No. 2
[hereinafter Nassau County Complaint].
131. See, e.g., Union County Complaint, supra note 101, at 18–26; Illinois Complaint,
supra note 101, at 11–28; Complaint at 19–42, City of Portsmouth v. AmerisourceBergen
Drug Corp., No. 2:17-CV-00723 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 16, 2017), ECF No. 1 [Portsmouth
Complaint].
132. See Complaint, County of Wayne v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 2:17-CV-13334-JCOEAS (E.D. Mich. Oct. 12, 2017), ECF No. 1.
133. See, e.g., Dayton Complaint, supra note 129, at 79–197; Oklahoma Complaint, supra
note 130, at 12–20; Nassau County Complaint, supra note 130, at 80–203.
134. See, e.g., Dayton Complaint, supra note 129, at 14–29; Oklahoma Complaint, supra
note 130, at 4–6; Nassau County Complaint, supra note 130, at 14–29.
135. Scruggs, supra note 112; see, e.g., Union County Complaint, supra note 101, at 18–
26; Illinois Complaint, supra note 101, at 11–28; Portsmouth Complaint, supra note 131, at
19–42.
136. Scruggs, supra note 112.
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for maintaining a closed distribution chain: usually137 the “Big 3” opioid
distributors.138
Besides alleging that an inequitable act (either misrepresentation or
diversion) caused direct injury to the plaintiff’s interests, the plaintiffs
employ either a tort-based theory or equitable theory to complete the directinjury claim. On the one hand, tort-based theories urge the court to award
damages in favor of the plaintiff by establishing that the defendants had a
duty of care toward the plaintiff and that they breached that duty of care
through their wrongful conduct. On the other hand, non-tort-based equitable
theories overlook duties of care and “do not hinge on fault, but rather on who
should pay when the public is damaged by the conduct of a legal business.”139
For example, when the state of Illinois sued opioid distributors for diversion,
they used four tort-based theories and one equitable theory.140 The tort
theories established a duty of care based upon the following statutes: the
federal Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act;
Illinois’s Narcotics Profit Forfeiture Act, which is very similar to the federal
RICO statute; Illinois’s Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices
Act; and the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (adopted by Illinois and
other states across the country).141 The sole equitable theory was based upon
the common-law concept of public nuisance.142 Richard Scruggs, a
prominent lawyer during the tobacco litigation, argues that non-fault-based
equity claims are strongest for government plaintiffs because they “enable
the states to say ‘so what’ to the industry’s defensive claims that the FDA
preemptively regulated opioids and that their addiction warning labels were
ipso facto sufficient.”143 Other scholars argue that the objective legal
strength of government-entity claims does not matter because their collective
strength will drive defendants toward settlement.144 This Note suggests that
the government is willing to make arguably dubious direct-injury claims
because their other options are bleak.
C. The Challenges for Opioid Plaintiffs in Other Forms of Civil Litigation
The first lawsuits against opioid companies were brought by addicted
individuals or their families and were directed at Purdue Pharma, the
company responsible for creating and marketing OxyContin. By 2003,
Purdue faced over 300 such lawsuits and had spent “tens of millions of
137. In some rare cases, cities make allegations of diversion solely against manufacturers.
See Everett Complaint, supra note 101.
138. See supra note 91.
139. Scruggs, supra note 112.
140. Illinois Complaint, supra note 101, at 44–78.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 44–53.
143. Scruggs, supra note 112.
144. See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., State Medical Reimbursement Lawsuits After Tobacco: Is
the Domino Effect for Lead Paint Manufacturers and Others Fair Game?, 27 PEPP. L. REV.
685, 687–90 (2000). Rather than focus on the strength or specifics of particular liability
theories, this Note focuses on the general role of direct-injury claims as they relate to other
forms of civil litigation.
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dollars in legal fees maintaining an aggressive no settlement stance.”145 The
individual and class action lawsuits continued to grow in numbers over the
next several years. It is contested whether these lawsuits were “successful”
or “failed” attempts146 because, while Purdue won most of the cases at the
summary judgment stage,147 information gathered through these lawsuits
was the driving factor behind the criminal prosecution of Purdue in 2007.148
It is also difficult to gauge the success of the individual lawsuits because
so many were settled before courts made any judgment on the substantive
claims. In 2006, two firms that represented around “5,000 claimants
reportedly settled their cases . . . for a total of $75 million.”149 In 2007,
Purdue made another series of big settlements: two in July totaling $40
million, a mass settlement of 1000 lawsuits in February for $75 million,150
and many of the remaining 370 lawsuits during the criminal prosecution for
$130 million.151 Regardless of whether these lawsuits are labeled as
successes or failures, there are multiple obstacles that both individual and
class action lawsuits will face in the future.
1. Blameworthy Victims in Opioid Litigation
When individual addicts (or their families) sue large pharmaceutical
companies, regardless of the type of liability theory they use, they are
hindered by two features: blameworthiness and an unequal balance of
resources. The blameworthiness of the plaintiff (or decedent) in individual
lawsuits has allowed opioid defendants to assert the following defenses:
product misuse,152 wrongful conduct,153 and contributory or comparative
negligence.154 Individual victims simply cannot escape the fact that their
blameworthy behavior has contributed to their own addiction and makes
them less deserving of relief from opioid companies.
a. Product Misuse
One form of blameworthy opioid-addict behavior is the misuse of
prescription opioids, which involves a disregard for product labels or
unorthodox methods of drug ingestion. A product-manufacturer defendant
may assert the product-misuse defense whenever an alleged injury to the
plaintiff is the result of “abnormal handling, abnormal preparation for use, or

145. Frederickson, supra note 74, at 134.
146. See STEVEN GARBER, ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF PRODUCT LIABILITY AND OTHER
LITIGATION INVOLVING THE SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF PHARMACEUTICALS 27, 38 n.29
(2013).
147. Ausness, supra note 66, at 1122.
148. See Joseph, supra note 76.
149. GARBER, supra note 146, at 38 n.29.
150. Id.
151. See United States v. Purdue Frederick Co., 495 F. Supp. 2d 569, 572 (W.D. Va. 2007).
152. See Labzda v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1356 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
153. See Foister v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 295 F. Supp. 2d 693, 704 (E.D. Ky. 2003).
154. See infra notes 194–205 and accompanying text.
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abnormal consumption of the product” at issue.155 The exact definition of
product misuse has varied across jurisdictions, but the Model Uniform
Product Liability Act states that misuse occurs whenever “the product user
does not act in a manner that would be expected of an ordinary reasonably
prudent person who is likely to use the product in the same or similar
circumstances.”156
Different courts have held that product misuse is synonymous with
unintended, unforeseeable, unanticipated, or unexpected uses of a product.157
Depending on the jurisdiction, misuse is interpreted either as a part of the
defendant’s burden of proof (an affirmative defense) or a part of the
plaintiff’s burden of proof (effectively negating an essential element of the
plaintiff’s case).158 For example, in Sherk v. Daisy-Heddon,159 fourteenyear-old Robert Saenz shot his friend James Sherk using a Daisy-Heddon BB
gun.160 The families of Sherk and Saenz brought an action against the
manufacturer, asserting that Daisy-Heddon failed to warn its consumers that
their pump-up BB rifle was more powerful than others.161 The issue was that
Saenz shot Sherk in the head from close range, despite his knowledge that
BBs fired from close range “could kill animals and blind a person.”162 The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania applied the second interpretation of product
misuse, found that Saenz’s misuse of the product negated the element of
proximate cause, and dismissed the case.163
For individual lawsuits against opioid companies, the second
interpretation of product misuse is similarly detrimental to a plaintiff’s case.
Labzda v. Purdue Pharma,164 a wrongful death claim brought by the family
of an opioid addict who died of an overdose, illustrates this point. Labzda’s
family asserted that Purdue was aware of their son’s doctor overprescribing
OxyContin but “did not attempt to curtail the inappropriate prescriptions,”
which was “a breach of the duty of care in the marketing and distribution of
the product.”165 The court dismissed the case because, on the night of his
death, in addition to consuming two 80-milligram tablets of OxyContin,
Labzda smoked marijuana, drank a substantial quantity of alcohol,166 “and
took approximately three tablets of the strongest strength of Xanax.”167
Moreover, he chose to crush and inhale his OxyContin pills rather than ingest
155. Annotation, Product Misuse Defense, 65 A.L.R. 4th 263 § 2[a] (1988).
156. Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,737 (Oct. 31, 1979).
157. Annotation, supra note 155, pt. VII.
158. Alfred W. Gans et al., Annotation, Misuse, Abuse or Abnormal Use of Product, 6 Am.
L. Torts § 18:158 (2017).
159. 450 A.2d 615 (Pa. 1982).
160. Id. at 618.
161. Id. at 616.
162. Id. at 618.
163. Id. at 618–20.
164. 292 F. Supp. 2d 1346 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
165. Id. at 1349.
166. “Michael drank approximately 14 beers (eight of them after 1:00 a.m.), shared
approximately five marijuana cigarettes, drank a shot of rum, drank at least two rum and
Cokes . . . .” Id. at 1350.
167. Id.
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them orally as instructed.168 The case was dismissed at the summary
judgment stage as the court found that the patient’s “intentional misuse of an
intoxicating product [OxyContin] [wa]s the sole proximate cause of the
injury.”169
The court in Labzda made clear that, like the Pennsylvania court in Sherk,
“Florida courts routinely apply the doctrine of sole proximate cause when the
user intentionally misuses a product to his detriment.”170 Labzda had
misused OxyContin despite being aware that crushing, snorting, and mixing
alcohol with the pills was dangerous.171 Thus, Labzda had destroyed any
chances for recovery because his misuse of the product was considered the
sole cause of injury under the laws of the state. The court argued that, like
alcohol distributors, opioid manufacturers cannot be held liable for a
plaintiff’s injuries if the plaintiff voluntarily misused their product.172
b. The Wrongful Conduct Rule
Another obstacle for lawsuits by individuals arises whenever an individual
plaintiff engages in unlawful or wrongful conduct.173 As a general rule, a
plaintiff “cannot maintain an action if he or she must rely, in whole or in part,
on an illegal or immoral act or transaction to which he or she is a party in
order to establish a cause of action.”174 The “wrongful conduct” or “serious
misconduct” rule is a way to completely bar a plaintiff’s claim and avoid
even partial damages through comparative fault.175 This ancient doctrine
derives from Lord Mansfield’s proclamation in Holman v. Johnson,176 “ex
dolo malo non oritur actio,” meaning “no Court will lend its aid to a man
who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal act.”177 The
wrongful conduct rule has been resurrected in the U.S. common-law system
under limited circumstances as a method to effectively “short-circuit” a
plaintiff’s claim.178
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1356.
170. Id.
171. The package insert for OxyContin clearly stated, in bold letters, that “TABLETS ARE
TO BE SWALLOWED WHOLE, AND ARE NOT TO BE BROKEN, CHEWED OR
CRUSHED. TAKING BROKEN CHEWED OR CRUSHED OxyContin TABLETS COULD
LEAD TO THE RAPID RELEASE AND ABSORPTION OF A POTENTIALLY TOXIC
DOSE OF OXYCODONE . . . . AVOID ALCOHOL while you are using this medicine.” Id.
at 1349–50.
172. “[F]oreseeable voluntary abuse of a non-defective product, such as alcohol, results in
the legal conclusion that the proximate cause of the injury to the consumer was his voluntary
abuse; the manufacturer of the substance is not liable for the injury to the user.” Id. at 1356.
173. See Lauren Rosseau & I. Eric Nordan, Tug v. Mingo: Let the Plaintiffs Sue—Opioid
Addiction, the Wrongful Conduct Rule, and the Culpability Exception, 34 T.M. COOLEY L.
REV. 33, 52–60 (2017).
174. 1A C.J.S. Actions § 68 (2017).
175. Joseph H. King, Jr., Outlaws and Outlier Doctrines: The Serious Misconduct Bar in
Tort Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1011, 1017 (2002).
176. (1775) 1 Cowper 341 (KB).
177. Id. at 343.
178. See King, supra note 175, at 1017.
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One of those limited circumstances has involved personal injury claims by
prescription medication addicts and their families. In Orzel v. Scott Drug
Co.,179 a “drug user’s claim against [a] pharmacy for allegedly negligently
and illegally filling [the] drug user’s purportedly valid prescriptions was
barred since it was based, at least in part, on [the] drug user’s illegal
conduct.”180 The court in Orzel explained the rationale behind the wrongful
conduct rule: (1) if courts made relief available for wrongdoers, they would
be condoning illegal conduct; (2) courts must foreclose any possibility of
wrongdoers profiting from or being compensated for their illegal acts; and
(3) “related to the two previously mentioned results, the public would
[otherwise] view the legal system as a mockery of justice.”181
Foister v. Purdue Pharma, L.P.182 is another illustration of the wrongful
conduct rule and involves the specific issue of opioid addiction rather than
drug addiction in general.183 In Foister, seven plaintiffs sued Purdue for
failing to properly warn its consumers of OxyContin’s addictiveness.184 All
but one plaintiff illegally altered his or her prescription pills before ingesting
them.185 In order to satisfy their opioid cravings, some plaintiffs would crush
their pills and snort them, and some intravenously injected up to eight pills a
day.186 The court held that the plaintiffs’ illegal alteration of the pills
constituted wrongful conduct and was the proximate cause of their
injuries.187 The court justified its decision by citing the public policy
concerns from Orzel.188
Other cases have reached similar results to Foister and involved much
more sympathetic plaintiffs. In Price v. Purdue Pharma Co.,189 the
plaintiff’s opioid addiction began when doctors prescribed him OxyContin
to treat “his sickle cell anemia and related pain.”190 There was no evidence
of illegal alteration of prescription pills, but there was evidence of doctor179. 537 N.W.2d 208 (Mich. 1995).
180. Id. at 208.
181. Id. at 213.
182. 295 F. Supp. 2d 693 (E.D. Ky. 2003).
183. See id. at 693–709.
184. Id. at 696–701. It is noteworthy that the plaintiffs in this case were far from
sympathetic; one of them “had an extensive criminal history which included malicious
wounding of a police officer, assault, criminal mischief, terroristic threatening, conspiracy to
possess, sale [sic] and deliver cocaine, possession of cocaine, possession of drug
paraphernalia, unlawful taking, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, criminal
trespassing” and many other convictions. Id. at 700–01.
185. See id. at 703.
186. One plaintiff had a particularly complicated method for abusing prescription pills. Id.
at 697. In his own words, he would
lick the coating off of [the OxyContin], bust them off, buy a bottle of water and pour
it in a cap, and . . . just draw up seven units of water and throw on it, take it back to
the rig and work it up, and take a piece of cotton off the filter and put it on the needle
and filter it, draw it up and hit it.
Id.
187. Id. at 704.
188. Id.
189. 920 So. 2d 479 (Miss. 2006).
190. Id. at 482.
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shopping191 to satisfy his opioid cravings; Price traveled to three different
cities, visited seven different pharmacies, attended ten different clinics, and
consulted with ten different physicians to obtain as many prescription
medications as possible.192 Although much more sympathetic than the
plaintiffs in Foister, Price had similarly engaged in illegal conduct to further
his opioid addiction. Invoking Lord Mansfield’s maxim from Holman v.
Johnson, the Mississippi court barred the plaintiff’s claim entirely.193
c. Contributory and Comparative Negligence
Even if a wrongful-conduct or product-misuse defense by opioid
companies is rejected, there remains a potential obstacle for opioid addicts
and their families when suing opioid manufacturers and distributors:
contributory or comparative negligence. Although opioid lawsuits have not
reached the question of contributory negligence because none have reached
the jury-deliberation stage, it is highly likely that this issue will arise in future
lawsuits and thus influence the likelihood of a successful settlement. The
Second Restatement of Torts describes contributory and comparative
negligence as “conduct on the part of the plaintiff which falls below the
standard to which he should conform for his own protection, and which is a
legally contributing cause co-operating with the negligence of the defendant
in bringing about the plaintiff’s harm.”194 An opioid addict’s decision to
misuse drugs or ignore warning labels, for example, is likely to fit within the
definition of contributory or comparative negligence. Contingent upon the
law a state follows and the plaintiff’s level of negligence, an opioid addict’s
negligent conduct may either bar her claim entirely or reduce the amount of
damages she receives.195
Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia, and the District of
Columbia all follow a strict contributory negligence regime that makes it
likely that an opioid addict’s negligent behavior will completely bar her
claim.196 In those five jurisdictions, “a plaintiff’s recovery is completely
barred when the plaintiff’s negligence contributes in any degree to the cause
of the injury.”197 Thus, if the plaintiffs in Foister or Price brought their
action in an Alabama court, they would almost certainly be barred from
recovery under the contributory negligence rule because their improper
conduct in obtaining or ingesting prescription pills fell below the standard of

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
Price, 920 So. 2d at 482.
Id. at 484–86.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (AM. LAW INST. 1966).
See 9 LOUIS R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PERSONAL INJURY: ACTIONS,
DEFENSES, DAMAGES § 43.22 (2017).
196. See id.
197. Id. (emphasis added).
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a reasonable person and contributed to some degree to their opioid
addiction.198
The majority of states, however, have abandoned the contributory
negligence doctrine. Most states instead follow a “modified comparative
negligence” regime that will only bar a plaintiff’s claim if the plaintiff’s
negligence was more than 50 percent responsible for the alleged injury.199
The rest of the jurisdictions in America follow a “pure comparative
negligence” regime, “allow[ing] a contributorily negligent plaintiff to
recover damages . . . even when the plaintiff is 99 percent culpable.”200
However, even in the pure comparative negligence jurisdictions, when the
plaintiff’s negligence is 100 percent responsible or “the sole proximate cause
of the loss or injury,” the plaintiff’s claim will be barred.201 For example, in
Horton v. American Tobacco Co.,202 a decedent’s family sued a cigarette
manufacturer under a negligence and strict liability theory.203 The jury
“returned a verdict . . . in favor of the plaintiffs but awarded zero damages”
because it found his decision to continue smoking despite warnings of health
dangers 100 percent responsible or the sole proximate cause of his cancer.204
Thus, if an opioid addict’s negligent conduct in obtaining or ingesting
prescription pills is found to be more than 50 percent responsible for their
addiction and the subsequent harm, the plaintiff’s claim will be completely
barred in the states that follow a modified comparative negligence or
contributory negligence regime. In the other jurisdictions, the plaintiff’s
claim will be completely barred if the jury finds they are 100 percent
responsible for their addiction and the subsequent harm. It is yet to be seen
whether opioid addicts will reach the 50 percent or 100 percent threshold,205
but it is likely that jurors will bar their claims as they have for tobacco
smokers.
2. Why Aggregate Actions Are Useful for Opioid Victims
Another possible issue for individual victims (or even small groups of
victims) concerns unequal resource allocation and a negative value of return
for plaintiffs. A negative-value claim arises whenever the cost of a lawsuit
198. The court in Foister repeatedly emphasizes the illegality of the plaintiff’s conduct and
notes that their addictions were “dilemma[s] which they [themselves] created.” Foister v.
Purdue Pharma, L.P., 295 F. Supp. 2d 693, 705 (E.D. Ky. 2003).
199. Ten states follow a “not as great as” modified comparative negligence regime and
require that the negligence of a defendant exceed 50 percent for the plaintiff to recover. See 9
FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 195, § 43.22. Twenty-one states adhere to a “not greater
than” modified comparative negligence regime where a plaintiff’s claim will be barred if their
negligence was more than 50 percent responsible for the alleged injury. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. 667 So. 2d 1289 (Miss. 1995).
203. See id. at 1290.
204. Id. at 1291–92.
205. The author’s research for this Note could not identify a single opioid claim that
reached jury verdict. The question of contributory and comparative negligence as applied to
opioid claims remains to be addressed.
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exceeds the amount at stake, thus disincentivizing a single individual from
bringing forth the claim.206 Many opioid addicts have such negative-value
claims. Purdue Pharma, along with other pharmaceutical companies, is
known to take an aggressive stance toward litigation and resolutely defends
against every possible claim.207 This makes the cost of pursuing litigation
very high for plaintiffs, and even if the asserted damages are high, an
uncertainty of success208 will convert it into a negative-value claim. Most
victims will resort to contingency fee agreements, and plaintiffs’ lawyers find
it preferable for addicts to pool resources and split the risks of litigation
through aggregation. There are two types of aggregate lawsuits that could
achieve that goal: joinder actions and representative actions.
The joinder action is a permissive method to combine multiple plaintiffs
or defendants in the interest of convenience and to avoid “duplicate
presentation of evidence relating to facts common to more than one demand
for relief.”209 Joinder is beneficial because it allows for the efficient
resolution of similar claims and only binds parties to the suit. The downside
is that courts rarely allow massive joinder and are particularly adverse to
massive joinder arising from the use of the same pharmaceutical product.210
Injured parties who hope to aggregate identical claims of injury from the
same pharmaceutical product are forced to turn to representative actions.
The most popular form of representative action is the class action, but other
examples include parens patriae actions and qui tam litigation. Class actions
allow thousands of injured persons to “achieve economies of time and
effort.”211 The ability to aggregate claims and resources with other addicts
is key to redressing their harms. Unfortunately, class actions have “fallen
into disfavor as a means of resolving mass tort claims arising from personal
injuries.”212 There are problems with the other forms of representative
actions as well.
3. Aggregation Challenges in Opioid Litigation
Although representative actions are extremely beneficial to opioid addict
plaintiffs, each form of representative action faces major difficulties when
applied to prescription-opioid mass tort liability. Parens patriae actions are

206. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) (“Class actions . . .
may permit the plaintiffs to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate
individually.”).
207. Purdue did not enter into a single settlement related to opioid addiction until it had
spent “an estimated $250 million in sustained defensive efforts.” Frederickson, supra note 74,
at 134.
208. See infra notes 146–47 and accompanying text.
209. 7 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1652 (3d ed.
2001).
210. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.02 cmt. b(1)(A) (AM. LAW
INST. 2010).
211. Buford v. Am. Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243, 1250 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
212. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.02 reporter’s note cmt.
b(1)(A) (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
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inapplicable in the context of mass tort product liability, qui tam litigation213
has been wholly ineffective against opioid defendants, and class actions face
great difficulty obtaining class certification. Moreover, when analyzed as a
whole, all three types of representative action can potentially produce
inequitable results by binding nonparties to judgments.
a. Parens Patriae Actions Are Inapplicable
to Mass Tort Product Liability
The Supreme Court has never granted parens patriae standing for a mass
tort product liability claim. It is unlikely to do so in the future despite both
the steady expansion of America’s parens patriae doctrine and opioid
companies’ failure to challenge the doctrine.214 In every Supreme Court
case215 where state governments have asserted parens patriae standing, “the
harms suffered by the original (individual) victims were causally connected
to their residency within a particular state . . . and not another
jurisdiction.”216 By contrast, in the context of mass tort product liability
actions, “the state of residence and the harm sustained are independent
variables.”217 Unlike the typical parens patriae claim where the injury
asserted is unique to residence within a particular state, a mass tort product
liability claim against opioid manufacturers has no relation to one’s state of
residence because the opioid epidemic is ravaging the entire nation and not
just a single state.218
Moreover, mass product liability cases are unlikely to fit within the one
exception to the general rule: Massachusetts v. EPA. In that case, the state
of Massachusetts (along with local governments and environmental
organizations) sought to review the denial of a rulemaking petition by the

213. See infra Part II.C.3.b.
214. Parens patriae standing was contested in the course of the tobacco litigation, but the
court never addressed it and focused on other grounds for finding that the plaintiffs lacked
standing. See City & County of San Francisco v. Philip Morris, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1130, 1142
(N.D. Cal. 1997) (dismissing claims for lack of standing because the harms asserted by San
Francisco were too far removed from a tobacco manufacturer’s misconduct); City of Chicago
v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 133–36 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (dismissing the claims of
the City of Chicago for lack of standing due to failure to demonstrate causation).
215. There is one exception: Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). See infra notes
219–24 and accompanying text.
216. DONALD G. GIFFORD, SUING THE TOBACCO AND LEAD PIGMENT INDUSTRIES:
GOVERNMENT LITIGATION AS PUBLIC HEALTH PRESCRIPTION 126 (2010); see also, e.g., Alfred
L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982) (addressing
parens patriae in the context of a farmer’s decree that affected only Puerto Rican workers);
Georgia v. Pa. R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 443–44 (1945) (determining that a railroad company’s
price-fixing adversely affected Georgia citizens); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 248
(1901) (involving efforts by Missouri to stop the construction of a canal that would funnel
1500 tons of Chicago’s trash to Missouri); Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1900)
(involving Texas’s embargo on all goods from New Orleans to stop the spread of yellow
fever).
217. GIFFORD, supra note 216, at 126.
218. See supra Introduction.
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EPA that would have regulated motor vehicle emissions.219 The Court
determined that Massachusetts had parens patriae standing despite the fact
that greenhouse gases affect everyone throughout the country (and
throughout the world) because the state lost its power to regulate
environmental threats when the federal government transferred that authority
to the EPA.220 This exception adheres to the general purpose of parens
patriae claims: a method for states “to protect the general welfare—where
they ha[ve] no other constitutional means of doing so.”221
Mass tort claims do not fit within the Massachusetts v. EPA exception nor
do they align with the general rationale behind parens patriae standing.
Although one could argue that the opioid epidemic qualifies as an
“environmental harm”222 similar to the greenhouse gases at issue in
Massachusetts v. EPA, there are differences between the two cases that
preclude parens patriae standing. First off, in the opioid litigation, the states
are not suing the entities to whom they transferred regulatory powers (the
FDA or the DEA) for their inability to properly monitor the opioid industry;
they are suing the manufacturers directly. Secondly, government entities
have plenty of other constitutional means available to them to address opioid
addiction, and indeed they have pursued those other means.223 Civil
litigation is merely another method for the states to recover lost funds.
b. Qui Tam Litigation: Rare and Ineffective
Qui tam litigation is another form of representative action that is difficult
to initiate because it requires the assistance of a “whistleblower.”
Furthermore, in the one instance it has been used against opioid companies
it was wholly ineffectual. In 1863, the government passed the False Claims
Act, which gave rise to what are known as “qui tam” lawsuits, where a private
party (usually a “whistleblower” exposing illegal activity from within a
corporation) sues on behalf of themselves and the government.224 Qui tam
lawsuits became very popular225 once the False Claims Act was amended to
increase recovery amounts so relators could recover up to 30 percent of the
proceeds and full recovery of their attorney’s fees.226 Qui tam lawsuits have
been a particularly useful tool against drug companies; according to the
Assistant Attorney General, whistleblowers sued “over 200 drug
manufacturers” in 2004.227
219. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 505 (2007).
220. See GIFFORD, supra note 216, at 126–27.
221. Thomas, supra note 118, at 791.
222. See GIFFORD, supra note 216, at 127.
223. See supra Part I.
224. Frederickson, supra note 74, at 123.
225. There were over four hundred qui tam lawsuits in 2004. Edward P. Lansdale, Note,
Used as Directed?: How Prosecutors Are Expanding the False Claims Act to Police
Pharmaceutical Off-Label Marketing, 41 NEW ENG. L. REV. 159, 176 (2006).
226. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1)–(2) (2012).
227. Jonathan K. Henderson & Quintin Cassady, Drug Deals in 2006: Cutting Edge and
Regulatory Issues in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 15 ANNALS HEALTH L. 107, 109 (2006).
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Although qui tam lawsuits have led to many victories for the U.S.
government against drug companies in general,228 these lawsuits have been
quite unsuccessful against opioid companies specifically. For one, qui tam
lawsuits require the assistance of a “whistleblower,” someone willing to
release secrets about their employer and initiate lengthy litigation. Mark
Radcliffe is the only “whistleblower” to have fought the opioid industry; he
targeted Purdue Pharma and failed repeatedly.229 At first, Radcliffe sued on
behalf of himself and the U.S. government, alleging that his former employer,
Purdue Pharma, had “misrepresented to physicians the relative potency of
Purdue’s pain medication, OxyContin, which resulted in federal and state
agencies, such as Medicaid, paying more than was necessary in
reimbursement.”230 At the district court level, his complaint was dismissed
because it failed to reach the high pleading standards of Rule 9(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.231 At the appellate level, the court
dismissed his complaint on separate grounds: Radcliffe had apparently
signed a release when leaving Purdue that “in exchange for a considerable
sum of money and other benefits” discharged Purdue of “all liability.”232
About two years after Radcliffe’s claims were dismissed, his wife resurrected
his claims and initiated her own qui tam litigation with almost identical
claims to her husband’s.233 She failed at both the district234 and appellate
level, just like her husband.235
c. The Difficulty of Class Certification in Opioid Litigation
Class actions, although more successful than qui tam lawsuits, face major
difficulties during the certification stage. To be certified as a class action,
the prospective class must meet the requirements set forth in Rule 23.236
First, the plaintiff must satisfy all four of Rule 23(a)’s requirements:
(1) numerosity of class members, (2) commonality of legal or factual
questions, (3) typicality of claims and defenses of the class representative,
and (4) adequacy of class representation.237 In addition to meeting the Rule
228. See Erika Kelton, Revival of Gilead Whistleblower’s Lawsuit Should Stoke Fear in
Big Pharma, FORBES (Sept. 26, 2017, 4:29 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/erikakelton/
2017/09/26/revival-of-gilead-whistleblowers-lawsuit-should-stoke-fear-in-big-pharma
[https://perma.cc/4CAD-8D9E] (discussing successful qui tam lawsuits by the U.S.
government against Big Pharma companies).
229. See United States ex rel. May v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 5:10-CV-01423, 2012 WL
4056720 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 14, 2012), vacated and remanded, 737 F.3d 908 (4th Cir. 2013);
United States ex rel. Radcliffe v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 582 F. Supp. 2d 766 (W.D. Va. 2008),
rev’d in part, 600 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 2010).
230. United States ex rel. Radcliffe v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 1:05CV00089, 2009 WL
161003, at *2 (W.D. Va. Jan 25, 2009), aff’d on other grounds, 600 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 2010).
231. Id. Rule 9(b) requires that “a party must state with particularity the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake.” FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
232. United States ex rel. Radcliffe, 600 F.3d at 326.
233. United States ex rel. May, 2012 WL 4056720, at *1.
234. Id. at *8.
235. United States ex rel. May v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 811 F.3d 636, 643 (4th Cir. 2016).
236. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
237. Id. r. 23(a).
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23(a) prerequisites, the plaintiff must fit into one of the categories set forth
in Rule 23(b).238 Many courts dismiss class actions against opioid companies
for failure to satisfy Rule 23(a) and thus do not discuss Rule 23(b).239
For example, in Campbell v. Purdue Pharma,240 two plaintiffs hoped to
represent a class of Missouri residents who suffered harm as a result of being
“prescribed and consum[ing] OxyContin for the treatment of any condition
other than moderate to severe pain caused by terminal illness or moderate to
severe pain caused by non-chronic condition.”241 For the 23(a)(1)
numerosity requirement, the plaintiff was required to establish a “reasonable
estimate” of the number of prospective class members.242 The plaintiff’s
estimate that there would be “thousands of persons in the Class” was
considered unreasonable.243 Alternatively, the plaintiffs tried to prove
numerosity by using the national sales data of OxyContin, noting that “in
2002, there were approximately 6.2 million OxyContin[] prescriptions for
noncancer pain.”244 In this particular case, the court accepted national sales
data as sufficient evidence to establish numerosity.245 But in another case,
Gevedon v. Purdue Pharma,246 the court held that information of “sales
volume alone will not justify a finding of numerosity.”247
Gevedon is an interesting case because it also shows how difficult it is for
opioid class actions to satisfy the 23(a)(2) requirement for commonality. The
plaintiffs in Gevedon sought to certify a class of Kentucky residents “who
have obtained OxyContin and/or who obtain OxyC[o]ntin in the future” in
order to bring a product liability action against Purdue Pharma.248 Judge
Danny Reeves denied class certification because determinations of liability
were reliant upon individualized questions of fact.249 Judge Reeves had ruled
the same way in the earlier case of Foister v. Purdue Pharma, L.P. when
plaintiffs sought to certify a broader class of “all persons who have been
harmed due to the addictive nature of OxyContin.”250 The court held that
cause-in-fact determinations were highly specialized and that individual
inquiries were required to determine whether “dosage, use and manner of
administration of the drug, individual and family medical and psychological
histories, [or] level of personal awareness regarding the purported risks and
medical reasons for use” were the actual causes of injury.251 In the Southern
238. Id. r. 23(b).
239. See Ausness, supra note 66, at 1137–44.
240. No. 1:02-CV-00163TCM, 2004 WL 5840206 (E.D. Mo. June 25, 2004).
241. Id. at *1.
242. Id. at *4.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at *11.
246. 212 F.R.D. 333 (E.D. Ky. 2002).
247. Id. at 338.
248. Id. at 336.
249. Id. at 336–37.
250. No. Civ. A. 01–268–DCR, 2002 WL 1008608, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 26, 2002)
(emphasis added).
251. Id. at *8.
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District of Ohio and in the Eastern District of Missouri, when dealing with
fact patterns similar to Foister, courts have denied certification on similar
grounds.252
Even the 23(a)(3) typicality requirement has created difficulties for class
certification. The Missouri court in Campbell explained that, to pass
typicality, the named plaintiff must “have the same essential characteristics
as the claims of the class at large and is designed to prevent an instance where
the legal theories of the named plaintiff may potentially conflict with those
of absent plaintiffs.”253 There were two named plaintiffs in Campbell, David
and Belinda Campbell, who each took varied doses of OxyContin254 and
simultaneously ingested OxyContin with other drugs such as Xanax, Vioxx,
and Zoloft.255 Both of these factors would influence a finding of causation
and open a range of conduct-based defenses that may conflict with the
theories of the general class.256 These essential factors “preclude[d] a finding
that their claims are typical of the class.”257 It is very difficult to create a
class of opioid defendants large enough to fulfill numerosity and similar
enough to pass typicality and commonality. Moreover, even if a class of
addicts or consumers is somehow certified, class actions are problematic
because they foreclose the possibility of future lawsuits.
d. Potential to Bind Nonparties to Judgment
In addition to their individualized problems, all traditional representative
actions have the potential to bind nonparties to the judgment, which produces
potentially inequitable results for future plaintiffs. All the traditional
representative actions (class action, qui tam, parens patriae) are
distinguished from other forms of aggregate lawsuits in that they have the
potential to bind nonparties.258 It is intuitive that a class action would bind
nonparties because the named plaintiff is acting as a representative for
similarly situated parties. In the case of parens patriae lawsuits, however, it
is harder to imagine why the government has the ability to bind nonparties
when it is representing the general welfare rather than a particular group of
injured citizens.259 Nevertheless, courts find that nonparties are bound to the
judgment entered against a parens patriae representative just as they would
252. See Campbell v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 1:02-CV-00163 TCM, 2004 WL 5840206,
at *11 (E.D. Mo. June 25, 2004); Harris v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 218 F.R.D. 590, 597 (S.D.
Ohio 2003) (denying class certification because individualized inquiries such as product
misuse “would trigger further individualized inquiries unique to those class members who
abuse the drug”); Wethington v. Purdue Pharma LP, 218 F.R.D. 577, 581 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
253. Campbell, 2004 WL 5840206, at *8 (quoting Dhamer v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.,
183 F.R.D. 520, 526 (N.D. Ill. 1998)).
254. David Campbell had filled 436 prescriptions and his wife Belinda filled 247. Id. at
*8–9.
255. Id.
256. Id. at *9.
257. Id.
258. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.02 reporter’s note
cmt. b(1)(A) (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
259. See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text.
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be for a class action representative.260 If a class action or parens patriae
representative sues an opioid company, they may be foreclosing all future
actions against those parties. Direct-injury claims would be preferable to
other forms of civil litigation if they can function as representative actions
without foreclosing future litigation by residents and citizens.
III. DIRECT-INJURY GOVERNMENT CLAIMS AS A SOLUTION TO THE
CHALLENGES OF OPIOID CIVIL LITIGATION
Direct-injury government-entity claims circumvent the obstacles that have
hindered other forms of litigation against opioid companies. First of all,
government plaintiffs foreclose conduct-based defenses previously available
to opioid defendants261 because the local governments are blameless in the
context of the opioid epidemic. Second, unlike parens patriae actions,262
direct-injury government-entity claims are definitively applicable in the
context of mass tort product liability. In addition, direct-injury governmententity claims are inherently representative actions, allowing for the
aggregation of interests without any certification requirement and with no
potential to bind nonparties.263 Direct-injury government-entity claims also
allow for administrative and informal aggregation. Informal aggregation is
particularly important in the context of mass tort liability because it
incentivizes pharmaceutical defendants to settle early.
A. Circumventing Conduct-Based Defenses
Opioid addict plaintiffs and decedents are blameworthy individuals who
arguably facilitated their own addictions despite being aware of the
dangers.264 Their illegal conduct, product misuse, or contributory negligence
allows opioid companies to introduce conduct-based defenses that have the
potential to entirely bar the plaintiffs’ claims or diminish damage awards.265
In contrast to opioid addicts, government entities have not contributed to the
opioid epidemic and actually ameliorate opioid addiction through both
proactive and reactive measures.266 Thus, direct-injury government-entity
260. See, e.g., City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320, 340 (1958) (finding
the parens patriae judgment against the state binding “not only against the State, but also
against its citizens, including the taxpayers of Tacoma, for they, in their common public rights
as citizens of the State, were represented by the State in those proceedings, and, like it, were
bound by the judgment”); Wyoming v. Colorado, 286 U.S. 494, 509 (1932) (binding water
claimants in Wyoming and Colorado to the judgments entered against their representative
states); N. Cal. River Watch v. Humboldt Petroleum, Inc., 162 F. App’x 760, 764–65 (9th Cir.
2006) (holding that a public-interest group’s lawsuit was precluded because of a previous
parens patriae action by the state of California).
261. See supra Part II.C.2.
262. See supra Part II.C.2.
263. This is in contrast to traditional representative actions, which have burdensome class
certification requirements and have the potential to foreclose future litigation by similarly
situated plaintiffs. See supra Part II.C.2.
264. See supra Part II.C.2.
265. See supra Part II.C.2.
266. See supra Part I.

1174

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

claims circumvent all of the issues related to blameworthiness that
encumbered lawsuits by individuals against opioid companies: product
misuse, wrongful conduct, and contributory or comparative negligence.267
Opioid company defendants would, in most cases, fail to establish any of
these conduct-based defenses against a government plaintiff.
For one, opioid manufacturers and distributors are not provided with the
requisite behavioral evidence if a government plaintiff, rather than individual
addict, brings a claim. Whenever an opioid addict or a group of opioid
addicts sues an opioid company, they are required to prove causation based
on each opioid user’s ingestion habits.268 This requirement reveals
blameworthy conduct by the plaintiffs and grants the opioid company
defendant the necessary evidence to establish a conduct-based defense.269
Unlike individual lawsuits, government-entity lawsuits rely upon general
statistical data to establish causation and include no information regarding
the conduct of particular addicts within their sovereignty.270 The defendant
manufacturer or distributor would have to research behavioral patterns for a
huge population of addicts to prove that each addict was improperly ingesting
prescription pills. This burden makes it practically impossible for opioid
companies to assert any conduct-based defenses such as wrongful conduct,
product misuse, or contributory or comparative negligence. Furthermore,
even assuming that opioid defendants somehow find proof of widespread
misuse or wrongful conduct, it is still unlikely the defenses will hold up in
court.
1. Product Misuse
Even if the pharmaceutical companies find evidence of rampant
prescription pill abuse, government plaintiffs can rebut assertions of product
misuse. The product-misuse defense requires the moving party to establish
“unintended, unforeseeable, unanticipated, or unexpected” consumption of
the product that deviates from the conduct “of an ordinary reasonably prudent
person.”271 This burden of proof places opioid defendants in a lose-lose
scenario: On the one hand, if an opioid company admits that most addicts
responsible for depleting the state budget were using prescription pills as they
were intended, then they cannot assert the unintended-use defense. On the
other hand, if the opioid companies assert that a majority of addicts
responsible for depleting the state coffer were misusing their prescription
267. See supra Part II.C.1.a.
268. See Foister v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 295 F. Supp. 2d 693, 702–04 (E.D. Ky. 2003);
Labzda v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1356 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
269. See supra Part II.C.3.a.
270. Similar to when state attorneys general sued tobacco companies, the benefit of a
government-entity lawsuit in the context of the opioid epidemic is that it “decouple[s] the
states’ rights to recover from the expensive, time-consuming requirement of proving causation
and damages for each [individual], relying instead on statistical information.” Philip C.
Patterson & Jennifer M. Philpott, In Search of a Smoking Gun: A Comparison of Public Entity
Tobacco and Gun Litigation, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 549, 557–58 (2000).
271. See supra notes 155–57 and accompanying text.
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opioids (either by snorting, crushing, or injecting pills despite warning labels
or by combining those pills with other dangerous substances),272 then it cuts
against the argument that crushing, snorting, injecting, and mixing pills is
truly an unintended purpose. If opioid companies are aware that a majority
of users are crushing, snorting, injecting, and mixing prescription drugs, then
that is arguably an intended, foreseeable, anticipated, or expected use of the
product. Stated otherwise, if so many consumers are ignoring opioid
warnings, then perhaps even the “reasonably prudent” person craves more
powerful or immediate releases of opioids after experiencing withdrawal
symptoms.273 Opioid manufacturers face a Catch-22 because the productmisuse defense depends upon a showing of unforeseen circumstances and
unreasonable behavior; but the companies cannot prove product misuse
without conceding that the allegedly unintended actions were in fact
foreseeable, clearly not “unexpected,” and perhaps even “reasonable.”
2. Wrongful Conduct
Government entities are also in a unique position to foreclose the
possibility of a wrongful or illegal conduct defense. The wrongful conduct
defense is only applicable where the plaintiff is the party to misuse the
product at issue.274 Regardless of whether opioid addicts within a
government’s sovereignty illegally altered pills275 or illegally obtained
prescriptions,276 the government itself did not engage in such wrongful
conduct. Thus, the wrongful conduct defense will be unsuccessful against a
city, county, or state. This makes sense because the rationale from Orzel,277
which courts refer to when invoking the wrongful conduct bar to a plaintiff’s
claim,278 only applies when the plaintiff is a criminal or tortious actor. In
fact, government entities actually punish the illegal alteration or purchase of
prescription pills,279 so there is no worry that courts are “in effect . . .
condon[ing] and encourag[ing] illegal conduct.”280 Furthermore, the
possibility that wrongdoers will be unjustly enriched by the court’s decision
is very low.281 There is an arguably higher likelihood that a plaintiff’s verdict
will go toward increased police enforcement and other infrastructure

272. See, e.g., Foister, 295 F. Supp. 2d at 693–709 (plaintiffs crushed, snorted, and injected
OxyContin rather than ingesting the pills as instructed); Labzda, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 1350
(decedent crushed his prescribed OxyContin pills, took a higher dose than instructed, and
combined OxyContin with other drugs and alcohol).
273. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 173–75 and accompanying text.
275. See Foister, 295 F. Supp. 2d at 703–04.
276. See supra note 38; see also Price v. Purdue Pharma Co., 920 So. 2d 479, 482 (Miss.
2006).
277. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
278. See Foister, 295 F. Supp. 2d at 704.
279. See supra Part I.B.2.
280. Orzel ex rel. Orzel v. Scott Drug Co., 537 N.W.2d 208, 213 (Mich. 1995).
281. See id.

1176

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

improvements designed to stop wrongdoers from “receiv[ing] a profit or
compensation as a result of their illegal acts.”282
3. Contributory and Comparative Negligence
Government entities’ blameless qualities even foreclose opioid
companies’ best defense: contributory or comparative negligence. Similar
to the medical-cost-reimbursement lawsuits against tobacco companies in the
1990s, perhaps the greatest advantage of direct-injury government-entity
lawsuits is their ability to circumvent this defense. In 1994, Mississippi
Attorney General Mike Moore filed a lawsuit against tobacco companies
seeking to recover Medicaid costs expended by Mississippi as a result of
smoking-related illnesses.283 Fourteen other states followed suit and alleged
that they were entitled to recover their share of medical costs that resulted
from tobacco companies’ tortious conduct.284 That litigation bears striking
similarities to the ongoing opioid lawsuits: both seek to recover medical
costs expended upon the treatment of addictive products and both share
similar causes of action (fraudulent misrepresentation, negligence, violation
of consumer protection statutes, civil RICO claims, and equity-based claims
such as restitution and public nuisance).285 Most pertinent to the issue of
contributory negligence is the fact that both sets of litigation “are not brought
on behalf of the injured smokers [or opioid addicts]. Instead they are brought
on behalf of the states themselves to recover the medical costs they have been
forced to pay to care for indigent smokers [or opioid addicts].”286
The scholars Phillip Patterson and Jennifer Philpott explained the genius
behind the state tobacco litigation as “effectively forestall[ing]” one of the
tobacco industry’s best defenses: contributory negligence.287 The defense
of contributory negligence was no longer available to tobacco companies
because “the tobacco industry could not plausibly argue that the states . . .
contributed to the financial harm caused to them.”288 Similarly, opioid
manufacturers and distributors cannot plausibly argue that government
entities contributed to the financial harm caused by the opioid epidemic.
Thus, the contributory or comparative negligence defense for opioid
companies is essentially foreclosed when the government is the plaintiff.

282. Id.
283. Complaint, Moore ex rel. Mississippi v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 94-1429 (Miss. Ch.
May 23, 1994).
284. Graham E. Kelder & Richard A. Daynard, The Role of Litigation in the Effective
Control of the Sale and Use of Tobacco, 8 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 63, 73–75 (1997).
285. See id. at 80; supra notes 141–42 and accompanying text.
286. Kelder & Daynard, supra note 284, at 82 (emphasis added).
287. Patterson & Philpott, supra note 270, at 557.
288. Id.; see also Kelder & Daynard, supra note 284, at 82–83 (“The tobacco industry
cannot plausibly argue that the states chose to smoke or that they contributed to the financial
harm caused to them.”).
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B. An Effective Substitute for Parens Patriae Claims
In addition to avoiding the challenges that impeded individual lawsuits,
direct-injury government claims are an effective substitute for parens patriae
actions because they are definitively applicable in the context of mass tort
product liability. Moreover, they can be asserted by cities and counties as
the sole basis for standing whereas parens patriae claims cannot.289
The Supreme Court has never found parens patriae standing in a mass tort
product liability action, and it is unlikely that it will.290 Parens patriae is a
legitimate basis for standing when government entities have “no other
constitutional means” of protecting the general welfare.291 In order for
parens patriae to apply, “the harms suffered by the original (individual)
victims [must be] causally connected to their residency within a particular
states.”292 The sole exception to this general rule, the only circumstance in
which the Supreme Court has found parens patriae standing despite the harm
suffered being independent of residence within a particular state, is when one
government entity sues another government entity to which they have
transferred sovereign power.293 Mass tort claims by government entities do
not fit the parens patriae doctrine because: (1) government entities have
plenty of other constitutional means to address the opioid epidemic besides
civil litigation;294 (2) the opioid epidemic has affected the entire nation and
involves an injury disconnected from residence within a particular state;295
and (3) government entities are suing opioid companies, not federal agencies
to whom they have transferred regulatory powers.296
Direct-injury lawsuits, unlike parens patriae lawsuits, can be brought even
when the plaintiff’s alleged injury is disconnected from residence within a
particular state or when there are plenty of other constitutional means of
addressing a particular problem. Government entities can assert direct-injury
claims like any other litigant so long as there is injury to a sovereign or
proprietary interest of the state.297 The loss of tax revenue, for example,
qualifies as a direct injury to the state’s proprietary interests.298 There is
definitive national data on productivity lost due to opioid addiction that states
may utilize to prove lost tax revenue.299 So long as states are careful to

289. Cities and counties must always pair their parens patriae claims with a direct-injury
claim. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. There is no such requirement for directinjury claims.
290. See Part II.C.
291. Thomas, supra note 118, at 791.
292. See GIFFORD, supra note 216, at 126.
293. See supra notes 219–21 and accompanying text.
294. See supra Part I.
295. See supra notes 217–18 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text.
297. See Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 125, at 1882; see also 15 MOORE’S FEDERAL
PRACTICE, supra note 127, § 101.60(4)(a).
298. See Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 447–50 (1992); Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of
Interior, 674 F.3d 1220, 1234–35 (10th Cir. 2012).
299. See supra notes 18–19.

1178

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

provide specific evidence of lost revenue rather than mere speculation,
government plaintiffs will successfully establish standing.300
C. Direct-Injury Government Claims Are Inherently
Representative Litigation
Direct-injury government-entity claims are especially fascinating because
they inherently function as representative actions, allowing for the
aggregation of interests without any certification requirement and with no
potential to bind nonparties. Aggregation is particularly important in the
context of the opioid litigation because the costs of litigation may outweigh
the projected benefits.301 Pharmaceutical giants like Purdue Pharma are
known to take an aggressive no-settlement stance toward litigation,302 and
the probability of success is uncertain.303 For these reasons, the ability to
pool resources and split the risks of litigation is especially important.
Unfortunately, courts are unwilling to allow massive joinder involving the
same pharmaceutical product304 and traditional representative actions such
as class actions have great difficulty satisfying Rule 23(a).305 Direct-injury
claims have the ability to effectively aggregate citizen interests while
bypassing the obstacles that hindered representative actions.
Furthermore, direct-injury government-entity lawsuits are not subject to
traditional aggregation requirements because they do not fit the mold of mass
joinder or representative actions. A direct-injury claim is not a joinder action
because it does not necessarily join the claims of multiple plaintiffs into one
proceeding; it often involves just one plaintiff (a city, municipality, or
state).306 Furthermore, it is not a representative action because the
government is suing on behalf of itself, not on behalf of citizens or
consumers.307
Although direct-injury government-entity claims are not aggregate actions
in the formal sense, they are inherently representative actions because the
government functions as an inherent representative of nonparties to the suit.
When a state sues on behalf of itself it is disguising the fact that government
entities always represent the interests of their constituents. This concept of
inherent representation is best understood through analogy. Imagine a
company suing a third party for injuries that the company itself (not its
stakeholders) sustained. On paper, the company is acting only as a
representative of itself. In reality, however, the company is acting as an
inherent representative of its stakeholders because any injury to the
company’s interest necessarily hurts its employees, creditors, and other
300. See Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 674 F.3d at 1234–35.
301. See supra Part II.C.2.
302. Frederickson, supra note 74, at 134.
303. See supra notes 146–48 and accompanying text.
304. See supra note 210.
305. See supra Part II.C.3.c.
306. Of course, direct-injury claims may utilize the joinder rules to join more than one
plaintiff or more than one defendant, but the claims themselves are not joinders.
307. See supra Part II.A.
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constituents (in the form of lower salaries, fewer benefits, and higher risk of
debt default). Likewise, any verdict in favor of the company will trickle
down to its stakeholders either in the form of higher salaries, increased
benefits, and so on.
A direct-injury claim by a government entity is similar to a direct-injury
claim by a company. When the government incurs higher infrastructure costs
due to opioid addiction, its citizens end up bearing those costs through higher
taxes or reduced benefits.308 Similarly, when the government wins a verdict
against a third party (e.g., a tortious opioid manufacturer or distributor), the
citizens receive the fruits of the verdict through added benefits or lower
taxes.309 Although the court views a government entity’s direct-injury claim
as being solely representative of its own interests, in reality, the government
is acting as a representative for all of its citizens. This allows its citizens to
aggregate their resources (tax money) toward a collective litigation effort
lead by their attorney general.
Although direct-injury claims are inherently representative and reap the
benefits of aggregation, it is unlikely that courts will subject them to the
formal requirements of representative actions. Direct-injury claims will not
face Rule 23 class action certification and will not bind nonparties to the
judgment because courts are respectful of the form in which governmententity claims are brought; in general, the court is unwilling to look past the
stated parties in a complaint.310 In Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Kentucky,311
Purdue tried to remove a parens patriae action to federal court by arguing
that the state attorney general was acting as a class action representative.
Purdue “urged [the court] to look past the pleadings, the named parties, and
the stated causes of action to deduce the true nature of this proceeding.”312
Purdue highlighted how the “real part[y] in interest” was not the county or
the state “but individual consumers for whom the Attorney General is acting,
in effect, as a disguised class representative.”313 Despite Purdue’s
description of the claim, the court stuck to the form of the pleadings and
308. See John Caniglia, Cost of Opioid Epidemic Soars, Hitting Taxpayers Harder Than
Ever, CLEVELAND.COM (Oct. 8, 2017), http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2017/10/
the_cost_of_the_opioid_epidemi.html [https://perma.cc/3RCR-PS4A] (explaining how
taxpayers end up covering the rising costs in child services, jail expenses, social services, and
so on); Brandon Morse, Opioid Epidemic Costs Taxpayers over $500 Billion a Year According
to White House, REDSTATE (Nov. 20, 2017, 3:30 PM), https://www.redstate.com/
brandon_morse/2017/11/20/opioid-epidemic-costs-taxpayers-500-billion-year-accordingwhite-house/ [https://perma.cc/29UY-LARQ].
309. Although it is possible that settlements or verdicts in favor of the government will go
toward unrelated causes, it is certain that the money will go towards programs intended to help
constituents. See 15 Years Later, Where Did All the Cigarette Money Go?, NPR (Oct. 13,
2013, 5:52 PM), https://www.npr.org/2013/10/13/233449505/15-years-later-where-did-allthe-cigarette-money-go [https://perma.cc/SQ56-86KQ] (describing how money from the
Master Settlement Agreement went toward smoking programs or other state programs focused
on unrelated causes such as literacy or agriculture).
310. See, e.g., Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Kentucky, 704 F.3d 208, 217 (2d Cir. 2013).
311. 704 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 2013).
312. Id. at 217.
313. Id.
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refused to view the parens patriae claim as a disguised class action.314 The
Supreme Court in Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp.315
affirmed the Second Circuit’s view and made evident that courts are
unwilling to look past the pleadings and will ignore real parties in interest.316
There, the Court held that a parens patriae action against an LCD
manufacturer did not constitute a “mass action” under the Class Action
Fairness Act, despite the fact that “100 or more unnamed persons . . . [we]re
real parties in interest as beneficiaries to any of the plaintiffs’ claims.”317 The
Court’s unwillingness to classify government-entity claims as mass actions
proves that it is unlikely to classify direct-injury claims (a subset of
government-entity claims) as aggregate actions. Although courts will not
view a single direct-injury government-entity cause of action as a formal
aggregation in itself, a series of direct-injury claims may be formally
aggregated through administrative aggregation.
D. Judicial Intervention—Administrative Aggregation
A group of direct-injury government-entity claims may be aggregated
through administrative means just like any other form of litigation.
Administrative aggregation “enable[s] judges to coordinate separate lawsuits
for efficient processing.”318 Unlike representative actions, which may be
initiated as a single action, administrative aggregation begins with separate
trials that are later consolidated by judges.319 Separate trials are consolidated
either as authorized by special procedural rules through formal
administrative aggregation or “outside the ambit of specific rules or statutes”
through informal administrative aggregation.320 One type of formal
administrative aggregation is federal multidistrict consolidation,321 which
allows a judicial panel of seven judges to aggregate claims with common
facts in the interest of convenience, efficiency, and fairness.322
On September 25, 2017, a private attorney involved in the opioid litigation
moved to consolidate over sixty government-entity lawsuits from across the
country through multidistrict litigation.323 As the number of lawsuits filed
by government entities grew in numbers, so did the case list for Multidistrict
Litigation Request Number 2804 (“MDL 2804”). On December 5, the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) ordered consolidation of
more than one hundred lawsuits listed under MDL 2804, to be heard by Judge
314. Id. at 220.
315. 134 S. Ct. 736 (2014).
316. See generally id.
317. Id. at 742.
318. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.02 illus. 5(2) (AM. LAW
INST. 2010).
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012).
323. MDL Brief, supra note 102; see also Amanda Bronstad, Lawyers in Opioid Suits Aim
for MDL to Handle Dozens of Cases, NAT’L L.J. (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.law.com/
nationallawjournal/almID/1202799291523/ [https://perma.cc/39UY-2DK8].
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Dan Polster.324 Although some government-entity lawsuits were excluded
from the consolidation, the coordination is highly beneficial. It will ensure
consistent pretrial rulings and allow parties—especially the defendants—to
save resources “by litigating their case in a single court that’s most
convenient for the parties.”325 Although the JPML is the only entity that has
the ability to formally aggregate a series of direct-injury government-entity
claims,326 lawyers have the ability to informally aggregate their claims
through private aggregation.
E. Informal Aggregation Incentivizes Settlement
In addition to being administratively aggregated by the judicial branch, the
opioid litigation has been informally aggregated by private parties and state
attorneys general. Informal (or private) aggregation occurs when parties
involved in widespread litigation, rather than judges, “act as though the
separate suits were formally aggregated, coordinating their efforts to such an
extent as to amount to a treatment of the litigation as a single, integrated
whole.”327
Similar to administrative aggregations, these informal
However, unlike formal
aggregations begin as separate trials.328
administrative aggregations, informal aggregations continue as separate
trials.329 Rather than relying on judicial oversight, plaintiffs exploit “the
existence of multiple and related claims” and place management “in the
hands of a few attorneys or even a single firm” to aggregate lawsuits
themselves.330 Some scholars “argue that informal aggregation can be as
efficient as formal aggregation” and just as effective for the pooling of
resources.331
Learning from the 1990s tobacco litigation, plaintiffs involved in the
opioid litigation have informally aggregated their claims to pool resources
and coordinate strategy. Famous litigators from the tobacco litigation are
collaborating with private attorneys and state AGs to create a powerful force

324. In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 1375 (J.P.M.L. 2017).
325. Clay Hodges, Opioid Lawsuits Heading to Centralized Multidistrict Litigation (MDL
2804),
N.C.
PRODUCT
LIABILITY
LAW.
BLOG
(Oct.
4,
2017),
https://www.northcarolinaproductliabilitylawyer.com/2017/10/are-the-opioid-epidemiclawsuits-heading-to-multi-district-litigation.html [https://perma.cc/7EF5-NM8B].
326. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
327. Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Implications of
Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381, 383 (2000).
328. See id. at 383–84.
329. See id. at 386–408.
330. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.02 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST.
2010).
331. Id. § 1.02 reporter’s note cmt. b(1)(A); see Richard L. Marcus, Reassessing the
Magnetic Pull of Megacases on Procedure, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 467–68 (2001)
(questioning the need for consolidation of 2000 antitrust actions in the electrical industry
because “[d]uring roughly the same period of time, similar efficiencies were effected in
[products liability] litigation by informal arrangements created among counsel without
organized judicial oversight”).
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against opioid companies.332 Two lawyers in particular, Mike Moore and
Paul Hanly, are leading the effort. Mike Moore has spearheaded a
nationwide coalition against opioid companies. His name may only be listed
on a series of lawsuits filed in Mississippi, but his involvement spreads
beyond state boundaries.333 He has a built an alliance with his “longtime
friends . . . includ[ing] former Arizona Attorney General Grant Woods, the
first Republican state attorney general to join the anti-tobacco crusade, and
Chip Robertson, a former chief justice of the Supreme Court of Missouri who
helped his state sue tobacco companies.”334 In July 2017 he met with “more
than a dozen private attorneys” and coordinated legal strategies against
opioid companies just as he did for the litigation against tobacco
companies.335 Paul Hanly plays a similar role. Based in New York, he has
commenced lawsuits “for close to 30 of the state’s 62 counties.”336 Hanly
represented the thousands of private plaintiffs that settled with Purdue
Pharma in 2007 and is using the knowledge gained from those previous
lawsuits to garner a stronger force against opioid companies.337 Some
scholars view Hanly and Moore’s efforts as evidence of dangerous power
concentrations and argue that private aggregation in the context of mass tort
liability has grown so strong “that a small number of attorneys exercise a
virtual monopoly over public tort litigation.”338
Despite their monopolistic qualities, informal aggregations are particularly
useful in the context of mass tort liability because they increase the chances
of securing the government’s true objective: a large settlement. State AGs
already have “greater litigation resources and moral authority than is
typically present in mass tort actions initiated by private attorneys.”339 When
these state AGs combine with other AGs and private attorneys, “their
resources and moral authority are even more powerful.”340 Informal
aggregations as large in scope as the tobacco and opioid litigation create a
“combined litigation muscle, moral authority, and [high] potential for
winning overwhelming judgments.”341 Most importantly, the combined

332. Esmé E. Deprez & Paul Barrett, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, The Lawyer Who Beat
Big Tobacco Takes On the Opioid Industry (Oct. 5, 2017, 4:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-10-05/the-lawyer-who-beat-big-tobaccotakes-on-the-opioid-industry [https://perma.cc/AP3K-8AA3].
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Caroline Lewis, Meet the Manhattan Attorney Leading Local Governments’ Lawsuits
Against Big Pharma, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. (June 12, 2017), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/
article/20170612/HEALTH_CARE/170619990/meet-paul-hanly-jr-who-is-leading-thelawsuits-accusing-big-pharma-for-contributing-to-opioid-epidemic [https://perma.cc/JFJ67PMF].
337. Joseph, supra note 76.
338. Richard C. Ausness, Public Tort Litigation: Public Benefit or Public Nuisance?, 77
TEMP. L. REV. 825, 908 (2004).
339. Cupp, supra note 144, at 689.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 690.
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muscle allows plaintiffs to procure “large settlements even when their
underlying legal claims are questionable.”342
The ability to speed up settlement talk is valuable for plaintiffs involved
in public tort litigation because their best chance is the procurement of large
settlements. The plaintiff’s side of the opioid litigation has learned valuable
lessons from the tobacco litigation, when “State Attorneys General from
across the country joined forces to launch a full scale, multi-state, multi-issue
attack . . . recogniz[ing] that the most efficient approach to the litigation was
a multi-state coordinated negotiation process.”343
By focusing on
negotiation rather than adjudication, these AGs made it evident that
settlement was their true objective in the tobacco litigation. Similarly, when
the FDA sued Purdue Pharma for its off-label marketing of OxyContin,344 it
relied upon “extensive collaboration among the state Attorneys General and
the federal investigators to achieve a swift and extensive settlement against a
company and its wrongdoers.”345 Government entities are not concerned
with arguing questionable legal theories because they “do not expect their
cases to actually go to trial.”346 Instead, plaintiffs hope to “survive a motion
to dismiss” and settle without evaluating the “the doctrinal soundness of their
position.”347 Informal aggregation incentivizes defendants to settle their
claims swiftly and avoids evaluation of the plaintiff’s dubious claims. In
addition to bypassing certification requirements due to their inherently
representative nature, the ability to informally aggregate separate actions
makes direct-injury claims a mighty tool for opioid victims and the state and
local governments that represent them.
CONCLUSION
All branches and levels of government have pursued both proactive and
reactive measures to combat the opioid epidemic and recover societal costs
incurred as a result of the epidemic. Direct-injury government-entity claims
are perhaps the most interesting reactive measure because they allege injury
to the interests of the government entity itself rather than its constituents.
These direct-injury claims offer a more powerful alternative to parens
patriae actions and can be asserted by any government entity as the sole basis
for both recovery and standing. Echoing the tobacco litigation efforts of the
1990s, these government claims have been informally aggregated by
plaintiffs’ lawyers to create a powerful force against opioid companies.
Most importantly, direct-injury government claims elude the challenges
faced by both individual and aggregate actions in the opioid litigation. With
a city, county, or state as the plaintiff, the government is able to effectively
342. Id.
343. Ashley L. Taylor, Jr. et al., State Attorneys General: The Robust Use of Previously
Ignored State Powers, 40 URB. LAW. 507, 512 (2008) (emphasis added).
344. See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.
345. Taylor et al., supra note 343, at 514.
346. Ausness, supra note 338, at 906.
347. Id.
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foreclose conduct-based defenses reliant upon the plaintiff’s blameworthy
conduct.
Furthermore, these direct-injury government-entity claims
inherently function as representative actions that aggregate the interests of
taxpayers into a single action led by their AG. As an inherent rather than
formal representative action, these lawsuits reap the benefits of aggregation
but bypass the Rule 23(a) certification requirements that hindered class
actions against opioid companies. Furthermore, unlike class actions, they do
not have the potential to bind nonparties to judgments. Considering all the
benefits of direct-injury claims, it is no surprise that government entities
across the country have chosen civil litigation as their weapon of choice
against pharmaceutical giants.

